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DISASTERS IN THE MEDIA: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 2011 JAPAN 
EARTHQUAKE/TSUNAMI AND NUCLEAR DISASTERS 
 
 This cross-cultural study analyzed online newspaper stories about the March 2011 Japan 
earthquake/tsunami and nuclear disasters from two nationally representative newspapers: the 
NYTimes.com in the United States and the Yomiuri Shimbun in Japan. This study investigated 
stories published between March 11, 2011, and April 15, 2011. These online news stories were 
examined to determine their use of disaster myths, past disasters, media hype, and directly 
quoted sources.  
Results show that few disaster myths were used overall; however, there was a difference 
in the number of panic flight myths used in the newspapers studied. 
References to past disasters were also measured on whether or not they were in the story. 
It was more common that stories did not mention a past disaster when reporting about the March 
2011 Japan earthquake/tsunami and nuclear disasters. The NYTimes.com used more past 
disasters in its stories than did the Yomiuri Shimbun; Chernobyl was the most frequently 
mentioned past disaster.  
Results also show that there was no evidence of a nuclear crisis media hype in the 
newspapers during the time period analyzed. The study also investigated differences in the use of 
sources by the two newspapers. Counter to predictions, the Yomiuri Shimbun did not use more 
official sources than the NYTimes.com. 





 A closer investigation into each of the variables investigated in this study and the role of 
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On March 11, 2011, a powerful and devastating earthquake struck off the east coast of 
Japan. The Great Tohuku earthquake registered at 9.0 on the Richter scale and caused a tsunami 
with waves as high as 33 feet in some areas. The tsunami hit minutes after the earthquake struck 
and thousands of people had little to no warning to evacuate. Places like Miyagi, Japan, were 
almost wiped out, with thousands dead and thousands more homeless.  As of June 20, 2012, the 
reported death toll from the earthquake and tsunami was 15,863 and 2,949 were still missing 
(National Police Agency, 2012). In the wake of these events, three of Japan’s nuclear reactors 
showed signs of failure, causing a nuclear crisis. As much as 30 percent of Japan’s power comes 
from its 55 nuclear reactor plants spread throughout the island nation (World Nuclear 
Association), and a loss in nuclear power would result in rolling blackouts and evacuations for 
miles around the damaged nuclear plants.  
The devastating earthquake and accompanying tsunami and nuclear crisis produced 
countless images, videos, and stories; Japan and its citizens were heavily covered world-wide in 
the news media in the days and weeks that followed. This study seeks to answer the overarching 
question “Does culture affect the framing of disaster news stories?” In particular, I am interested 
in explaining the effect that culture may have on the prevalence of disaster myths, media hype, 
and gatekeeping. This study also sets out to test Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture and its 
ability to predict how newspapers from two cultures will cover a disaster. 
 During a crisis, people turn to the media (Elliott, 1989; Rozario, 2007; Wilkins, 1985). 
Audiences turn to the television or Internet looking for the most updated information about the 





and instructions on whether they should evacuate and how to get food and water. Those outside 
the disaster areas want to know whether their loved ones survived and the scope of the damage.  
The way disasters are framed in the media can be a sign of how much the media 
understand disasters.  Further, these frames may influence how the general public understands 
and responds to disasters and how disaster recovery unfolds.   For example, studies have shown 
that news media often perpetuate disaster myths (e.g., Tierney, Bevc, & Kuligowski, 2006; 
Scanlon, 2007; Solnit, 2009 ) and generate wall-to-wall news coverage, also known as media 
hypes (e.g., Vasterman, 2005; Vasterman, Yzermans, & Dirkzwager, 2005; Wien & Elmelund-
Praestekaer, 2009). Additionally, some studies have found that the gatekeeping aspect of news 
production is lacking during disasters, which contributes to conflicting and confusing news 
stories (Scanlon, Luukko, & Morten, 1978; Scanlon, 2007).     
Large-scale disasters, such as the one striking Japan, provide opportunities to investigate 
the differing effects of culture on news media coverage because of the world-wide attention these 
large disasters receive. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) state: “media content is both that [content 
as a manifestation of culture] and a source of culture. That is, media content takes elements of 
culture, magnifies them, frames them, and feeds them back to an audience. Media impose their 
own logic in creating a symbolic environment” (p. 60). Similarly, Goffman (1981) states: 
“Frames are a central part of a culture and are institutionalized in various ways” (p. 63). Culture 
is institutionalized in the education systems, the government and the media. Language is also a 
huge cultural influence, especially in the case of the Japanese who believe their language is what 
makes them Japanese (Gottleib, 2011).  
This study investigated online newspaper coverage of the March 2011 earthquake in 





culture influenced story frames by analyzing and comparing online news coverage in The New 
York Times and in The Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan’s largest circulation newspaper as well as highest 
visited daily online newspaper.  
This study focused on online news coverage during the immediate aftermath of the 
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis; thus it looked at 36 days of coverage. The reason for my 
interest in the immediate aftermath coverage is that this is when other studies have found 
evidence of disaster myths and media hypes as well as a lack of gatekeeping in news stories 
(Scanlon, Luukko & Morten, 1978; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1972; Fischer, 1994; Vasterman, 2005, 
Wien & Elmelund-Praestekaer, 2009).  
























The term “disaster” can evoke a multitude of emotions and images, and it is used many 
different ways in society. Disaster researcher Quarantelli (1987) has argued that there is no basis 
in logic and little hope in practice that a single definition can be devised that is universally 
accepted. Thus there have been many definitions used over the years. Fritz, an early sociologist 
in disaster studies, stated in a 1961 paper that disaster is: “…an event, concentrated in time and 
space, in which a society, or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society, undergoes severe 
danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure 
is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of the society is 
prevented” (p. 655). 
McFarlane and Norris (2006), both of whom work in the field of mental health, define 
disaster as “a potentially traumatic event that is collectively experienced, has an acute onset, and 
is time-delineated; disasters may be attributed to natural, technological, or human causes” (p. 4). 
Anthropologists Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (2002) define disaster as “A process/event 
combining a potentially destructive agent/force from the natural, modified, or built environment 
and a population in a socially and economically produced condition of vulnerability, resulting in 
a perceived disruption of the customary relative satisfaction of individual and social needs for 
physical survival, social order, and meaning” (p. 4). Although not as much detail is given as in 
the Oliver-Smith and Hoffman definition of disaster, Vasterman, Yzermans and Dirkzewager 
(2005), researchers in media and culture and in health services, define disaster as “acute, 
collectively experienced traumatic events with a sudden onset, and they can be both natural and 
man-made” (p. 107), agreeing in part that disasters are sudden and cause a disruption of 





The Japanese have only recently begun studies on a sociological level. Previous studies 
involving disasters have been done by civil engineers, architects, and urban planning (L. Peek, 
personal communication, September, 9, 2011). Due to the lack of studies done by the Japanese 
regarding the sociological level of disasters, there is no specific way in which the Japanese 
define disaster.  
For the purposes of this research, the definition that was used is a modified definition 
building off the work of Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (2002), Oliver-Smith (2009) and Button 
(2010). For this study, disaster was defined as an event that can be brought on by natural, 
modified, or built environments and that disrupts the lives of those affected to the point that they 
are unable to function normally in society. Disasters are not isolated events bound by time and 
space, but instead are set in motion by a set of preconditioned events that are followed by a series 
of cascading events, unfolding over time (Button, 2010).  
 
Agenda Setting  
Agenda setting, or media agenda setting (Dearing & Rogers, 1996), is the study of the 
importance of an issue on the mass media. Agenda setting is important to include in this study 
because it can help to explain the level of salience of an issue, for example, disasters. The media 
agenda is usually measured by the number of stories about a topic in a content analysis. Dearing 
and Rogers (1996) state: “Audience individuals presumably judge the relative importance of an 
issue on the basis of the number of media messages about the issue to which they are exposed” 
(p. 18).  
Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) and Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) define agenda 





correlates strongly with the importance that is attributed to these issues and topics by the public. 
They also state that agenda setting is the process where audience exposure to news about an issue 
will increase the ability of the individual to recall related issues from the past. Entman (2007) 
links agenda setting and framing by asserting that agenda setting performs the first function of 
framing: it identifies problems that are worthy of the government’s and the public’s attention. 
Agenda setting is where the oft-mentioned phrase that the media don’t tell people what to think, 
rather, what to think about comes from, whereas framing is the idea that the news media tell 
audiences how to think about events and issues.  
In most discussions of the agenda-setting role of the mass media, the concept of second-
level agenda setting is common. Also known as attribute agenda setting; this level says that each 
object on the agenda has more than one attribute, characteristic, or property that describes the 
object. The attributes of the object that journalists then choose to highlight can affect how 
audience members react when they think about that object (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). 
McCombs and Reynolds (2009) discuss how the concept of framing and attribute agenda setting 
are linked, stating that “framing and attribute agenda setting call attention to the perspectives 
used by communicators and their audiences to picture topics in the daily news” (p. 7).  
A consequence of agenda setting and framing is the resulting opinions from audience 
members based on the media attention to an object, issue, or event. For example, McCombs and 
Reynolds (2009) discuss how the media focus the public’s attention on the major candidates 
during an election which results in people forming opinions about those candidates who are 







Intermedia Agenda Setting 
Reese and Danielian (1989) address the concept of intermedia agenda setting influence in 
their work on the drug issue of the 1980s. According to Reese and Danielian, news media 
coverage about an issue or event will converge when news media organizations follow the lead 
of how other news organizations cover the issue or event. What results is “observed manifest 
similarities in media coverage—in timing, emphasis, and source selection” (p. 30).  Reese and 
Danielian’s study analyzed U.S. news media coverage of the drug crisis in the late 1980s. They 
attributed the massive convergence of coverage to intermedia agenda setting on the part of The 
New York Times; New York’s drug problem became a problem for the rest of the country due to 
the coverage received in The New York Times, which is considered a national newspaper; Reese 
and Danielian equate this to a follow-the-leader scenario.  
In another study, Danielian and Reese (1989) went further in their discussion of the 
cocaine issue by taking a closer look at intermedia agenda setting. They found that The New York 
Times had the most content regarding cocaine during 1985, surpassing the Wall Street Journal, 
the Washington Post and The Los Angeles Times coverage, and that by 1986 most other news 
media outlets had fallen in line with the amount of coverage that the New York Times had.  
 
The Framing of News 
Framing theory can help explain people’s reactions during and after catastrophes as well 
as their understanding of disasters. Framing theory’s foundations are sociological and were laid 
by Goffman who believed that individuals perceive events in terms of primary frameworks; these 
would later become known as schema. Goffman (1974) describes a primary framework as 





locate, perceive, identify, and label an infinite number of concrete occurrences. For example, 
Goffman offers the example of a coroner who would employ a physiological framework if asked 
to identify a person’s cause of death. That same coroner would use a social framework if asked 
to describe the person’s manner of death. These primary frameworks can exist without the 
person being aware of them.  
Entman (2007), building from Goffman’s idea that physiological frameworks and social 
frameworks are human interpretations of events, defines framing as “the process of culling a few 
elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them 
to promote a particular interpretation” (p. 164). Entman (2007) states: “If the media really are 
stunningly successful in telling people what to think about, they must also exert significant 
influence over what they think” (p. 165). Shoemaker (1989) states “The more media emphasize 
an issue, the more importance the public places on it” (p. 2). 
Similarly, Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) describe framing as being based on the 
assumption that how a topic or idea is characterized in the news story will influence how 
audience members understand it. Also, frames can raise the salience or importance of certain 
ideas that will then activate certain schemas or primary frameworks in people’s minds.  
Fully developed frames typically perform four functions: problem definition, causal 
analysis, moral judgment, and remedy promotion (Entman, 1993). Problem definitions 
practically determine the rest of the frame; they “determine what a causal agent is doing, with 
what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values” (p. 52). The 
causal analysis is where the forces creating the problem are identified—who or what 
organizations were behind it, what policies or laws helped create the problem. Moral judgment 





beliefs that society puts forth in an effort to prescribe what should be done to fix the problem. 
And finally, remedy promotion is where treatments for the problem, justifications for those 
treatments, and the effects of the treatments are offered. In his 2004 book, Entman gives the 
example of the attacks of 9/11, stating that the problematic effect was the deaths of thousands of 
civilians from an act of war against the U.S.; the cause was the Taliban government, its leaders 
and Al-Qaeda; the moral judgment was the condemnation of those agents as evil; and the remedy 
promoted was to go to war against Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Scheufele (1999) states that journalists’ decisions about story framing may be influenced 
by several social-structural or media organization factors. These factors can, according to 
Shoemaker and Reese (1996), include at least five factors in a journalist’s reporting: social 
norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, 
journalistic routines, and ideological or political orientations. Gamson and Modigliani (1987) 
argue that the frames journalists form can be explained by their norms and practices as well as 
the influence of other interest groups.  
 
Gamson and Modigliani (1989) argue that media discourse can be viewed as a set of 
interpretive packages that give meaning to an issue or issues and these media packages have one 
main frame that can help provide meaning to the disaster or events as they unfold. 
These packages can provide details about the problems or issues, which can also tell the 
possible costs associated with the issues and the issues’ possible implications. The core of the 
package is the frame and the rest of the package uses different symbols that suggest the core 
frame and position by using one or more of five framing devices: metaphors, exemplars, 





According to Pan and Kosicki (1993) and Entman (2004), journalists often use rhetorical 
devices to invoke images that help increase the salience of the topic and the vividness of a report. 
These vivid words and images that make up a frame can be distinguished from the rest of the 
story because of their capacity to stimulate support or opposition of the issue. This capacity can 
be measured by cultural resonance and magnitude (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Entman, 2004). 
Culturally resonant frames have greater influence because the words and images used are more 
understandable, memorable, and emotionally charged for the reader. For example, stories that 
were reported in the days after Hurricane Katrina used the framing device of metaphor by 
reporting that the disaster scene looked like a war zone. A New York Times reporter wrote “A 
shotgun rested in the boat next to Mr. Lovett, who said shots had been fired near him on occasion 
during the past week. ‘I don’t feel like I’m in the U.S. I feel like I’m in a war. All the guns, the 
chaos” (Longman, 2005). This “war zone” metaphor was seen in numerous articles discussing 
the response of the people of New Orleans (Tierney et al., 2006). “War zone” and “chaos” are 
catchphrases that evoke mental images, making the story resonate with many people; the 
repeated use of this frame the magnified the idea that much of New Orleans was like a war zone 
after Hurricane Katrina.  
Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) state that framing is both a macrolevel and microlevel 
construct. Macroconstruct refers to how journalists present the information to their audiences in a 
way that will resonate with the audiences’ existing schemas on the topic. “Frames, in other 
words, become invaluable tools for presenting relatively complex issues, such as stem cell 
research, efficiently and in a way that makes them accessible to lay audiences because they play 





how the individual forms an impression of the issues or event based on the information in the 
news story and the presentation of that information.  
 
Priming 
Framing can shape or alter the audience’s interpretations and preferences through 
priming. “Frames introduce or raise the salience or apparent importance of certain ideas, 
activating schemas that encourage target audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular way” 
(Entman, 2007, p. 164); those schemas that are activated are part of the priming process. Roskos-
Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, and Carpentier (2009) state that priming has the ability to change 
people’s later behavior or judgments related to the content (newspaper articles, broadcast media) 
that was processed.  Roskos-Ewoldsen et al. continue by stating that the effect of priming is time 
bound; they cite for example, studies demonstrating that the priming effect from coverage of 
violence fades quickly.  
Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) argue that priming has taken place when news content 
suggests to audiences that they should use specific issues as benchmarks, or as issues that 
resonate with them so they can effectively evaluate the performance of leaders and governments. 
This assertion is in line with Entman (2007) in that if the issues have resonated, then the reporter 
has reached his or her goal or intended effect.   
Price and Tewksbury (1997) argue that priming and agenda setting are accessibility 
effects because they are founded on memory-based models of information processing.  
According to Price and Tewksbury (1997), framing is an applicability effect; the outcome 





or more concepts so that after exposure to a message, audiences will be more likely to accept that 
they are connected.  
 
Framing Disaster Coverage 
Framing theory is relevant to the analysis of media coverage of disasters because it can 
help explain people’s reactions during and after catastrophes. For example, Berger (2009) 
explored the framing of crime after Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005. He reviewed newspaper 
articles from major publications, focusing on the New Orleans Times-Picayune, The New York 
Times, and the Washington Post, as well as CNN news broadcasts from the month after the 
storm. Berger argued that the media’s heavy use of crime frames in the first month after Katrina 
legitimized punishment as disaster policy. In a related study of Hurricane Katrina coverage, 
Haider-Markel, Delehanty, and Beverlin (2007) investigated the effects of racial group framing 
on the public in the aftermath of Katrina by conducting a national poll of adults. They 
hypothesized that a dominant media frame of Black storm victims would lead African Americans 
to develop a stronger empathy with storm victims, and thus more negative views about the 
government’s (all levels of government) overall response to the disaster. They found that African 
Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to indicate that President Bush was 
more to blame than local or state officials for the slow, inadequate, and ineffective response to 
Katrina’s aftermath. They also found that African Americans were more likely to believe that 
Bush didn’t care about them than were non-African Americans. 
Other researchers have investigated the extent to which media coverage is linked to the 
type of support areas receive after a disaster. If media stories were to frame an affected area as 





affected area as poverty stricken, much like Haiti had been portrayed after the 2010 earthquake. 
Further, areas affected by a disaster that do not receive media coverage or that are underreported 
in the media receive substantially less aid than those that are heavily reported. “Analyses of the 
distribution of this assistance have repeatedly shown that the level of news media coverage in the 
domestic press is the most consistent and most substantial influence upon the aid offered” (Potter 
& Van Belle, 2009, p. 297). Much of what causes a disaster to be underreported or ignored by 
the media is the magnitude of the disaster’s impact on humans. If the disaster is framed as having 
high human impact, which would include a high death toll and massive damage to the affected 
area, more aid will result (Van Belle, Rioux, & Potter, 2004). For example, hours after the 2010 
Haiti earthquake, reports hit Twitter, Facebook, and almost every major news publication. 
Within days after the quake, media personnel traveled to Haiti to write stories and capture 
images from the devastation. Social media’s and the news media’s response to the disaster 
resulted in prompt offers of foreign aid and faster fundraising (Hamilton, 2010).  
Although there were many news media accounts that helped bring in foreign aid, they 
failed to mention exactly why Haiti was in need of so much aid, besides the earthquake. There 
were many news media accounts and scholarly articles that were published in the months after 
the disaster that criticized the fact that most of the coverage lacked historical context citing the 
lack of information on how the Haitian people ended up in the economic situation they found 
themselves in before the quake hit and what they were doing to make things better (Balaji, 2011; 
deMause, 2010; Herllinger, 2010; and Ulysse, 2010). Bellegarde-Smith (2011) stated that 
American journalists lacked historical sophistication in their reporting.  It is crucial to understand 
that Haiti was in a very poor economic and social condition when the earthquake struck, 





months after the earthquake, a common frame was found: poverty, poor and pity. Balaji (2011), 
deMause (2010), Herllinger (2010), and Ulysse (2010) all discuss this idea of how Haiti was 
portrayed (framed). Residents said because of this coverage no one would ever want to visit 
Haiti, leaving the country’s economy in even worse shambles with no revenue from tourism. One 
native commented that instead of telling the readers how they (the readers) can help make 
Haitian’s lives better, the news media only focused on the negative aspects of the country and the 
earthquake (deMause, 2010).  
The coverage in Haiti and the coverage from Katrina are both examples of how reporters 
frame stories of disaster. They (the reporters) are the communication channels used to convey 
information about the disaster, what to do and often times how to understand what has happened. 
What’s important to remember is that each reporter, no matter how hard he or she may try to be 
objective, still has his or her beliefs and knowledge about crisis situations and will interpret the 
(frame) unfolding disaster accordingly.  
 
The Love/Hate Relationship between the Media and Emergency Agencies 
Over the years as journalism has evolved, scholars have taken a closer look at the media’s 
role in disaster reporting and the effects of disaster reporting. In the Handbook of Disaster 
Research, Scanlon (2007) discusses the media’s potential roles, stating that the media may be a 
critical tool for effective warnings. The media act as a link between the public and officials, 
making them the most important source of information during crises. Further, Scanlon states that 
the media can provide an outlet, or a way to cope with and understand the disaster for those 





Scanlon (2007) and Elliott (1989) agree on the media’s possible positive effects both 
during and after disasters. Elliott states: “News analysis both during and after a disaster can help 
people understand why the disaster happened” (p. 161). Elliott outlines three basic obligations of 
accurate reporting that the news media should meet when they explain the why or the how of a 
disaster: 1) news media should give people practical information associated with the disaster, 
such as areas in the disaster zone that are open and closed to travel, the extent to which 
businesses, and schools are open, information regarding government disaster relief 
operations/movements, and information that the public is entitled to such as corruption in the 
government’s response to the disaster; 2) this information should be given without causing harm; 
and 3) the news media should make every effort to provide accurate, complete, balanced, and 
relevant information.  
When the media are forced into a secondary role in times of crisis and disaster, the public 
could be affected. Wilkins (1985) stated that “studies focusing on actual media coverage of 
natural hazards have found that the accuracy and quantity of media warning messages varies 
directly with media contact with crucial government agencies, and that many community plans 
for disaster preparedness seem to place contact with the media in a somewhat secondary role” 
(p.52).  Wilkins argued that research has shown that the media can educate the public about 
hazards and that limiting journalists access to information could lead to delayed evacuations and 
preparedness.  
When the media are relegated to a secondary role, it can be detrimental to the public’s 
disaster response and lead to tensions between the emergency management response 
organizations (i.e., police and fire, etc.) and the media. News media personnel are shut out from 





only convey inaccurate information and will be nothing more than a problem for emergency 
personnel responding to the disaster-stricken communities (Scanlon, Luukko, & Morten, 1978; 
Scanlon, 2007).   
The news media tend to convey inaccurate information when they are forced to take this 
secondary role. It could be argued that because the news media workers are not getting the 
information they need to report on the disaster, they make assumptions about what is going on 
and must use less informed sources in their stories, which can lead to conflicting information 
being reported. Conflicting stories may arise and cause confusion and even interference with the 
disaster response (Elliott, 1989).  
 
Gatekeeping  
Scanlon et al. (1978) write that this reporting of conflicting stories happens because 
gatekeeping procedures are barely in existence after a disaster strikes. During disasters, the news 
media’s gatekeeping practices may become more lax because the traditional places to obtain 
official information are often scrambling to deal with the disasters; thus, the media have a 
tendency to present information quickly rather than accurately, leading to confusing and 
disorganized stories (Scanlon et al., 1978; Dynes, 1970; Barton, 1962; Fritz & Mathewson, 
1957).  
For example, after the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, the first reported death toll was 
272 and was published and broadcast throughout the U.S. (Fischer, 1994). Two weeks later the 
official final death toll was released, stating that 67 had died, not 272. These types of 





numbers with many victims being counted two or more times and many sources being just as 
uninformed as are the reporters.   
 
Sources 
The news media’s lack of gatekeeping can also lead to a skewed view of the disaster by 
the use of only certain sources. The use of sources in news stories is an important aspect of news 
reporting to take into consideration. A source is defined as a person or entity (e.g., a company or 
an organization) that provides information and opinions that are attributed to that person or 
entity. According to Brown, Bybee, Wearden and Straughn, (1987), sources should “meet 
standard definitions of reliability, trustworthiness, authoritativeness and articulateness” (p. 46). 
Reporters are expected to find reliable and legitimate sources that will help tell the story. Often 
times those reliable and legitimate sources are people who are in an elected or appointed 
position, or those who run the organizations, businesses, and events that the reporters are 
covering.  
Quarantelli (1981) argued that disaster news tends to rely heavily on a few sources, and 
these sources are typically official sources, i.e., sources that have primary social control 
functions. Official sources include police and fire department officials, and emergency 
management government agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and the American Red Cross. He found that the heavy reliance upon these official 
sources resulted in a limited view of the crisis, referring to this view as the “command-post point 
of view” of disasters. Because of this limited view, other views of the disaster are ignored in 
news accounts; other views may include those of the victims, local non-social control 





Button (2002) discussed source issues in his discussion about Jonathan Harr’s book, A 
Civil Action, the story of the class action case about toxic groundwater in a Boston suburb that 
killed six children and one adult. Button stated that Harr, like many journalists, failed to record 
the victim’s voices in his book, instead relying on government and corporate sources. According 
to Button, “The consequence is that some people’s accounts are valorized, while other accounts 
are marginalized” (p. 153). 
Past studies (Fishman, 1980, 1982) have found that reporters use sources to drive their 
stories. Journalists are more likely to follow the interpretive lead of respected sources 
(Dunwoody, 1993). Those respected sources are those who are authoritative or official, or are 
experts in their fields. Reporters seek out sources that will support their understanding of events, 
issues, and/or concerns, and, in the case of science, if the information being reported is new or 
seems as if the new information would be a stretch, they will find other scientists who will say 
that what the other scientist is claiming is not possible (Dunwoody, 1993).  
When it comes to source impact, researchers have found that direct quotes in news 
reports have more of an impact on people’s issue perception in stories (Gibson & Zillmann, 
1993) than do sources that are not directly quoted. Direct quotes help to frame stories, wherein 
reporters will call on many different people to speak to the topic at hand. Gibson and Zillmann 
(1993) conducted an experiment to investigate the use of direct quotes in news stories finding 
that the notion of direct quotation was indeed a powerful journalistic tool that can be used to 
influence media consumers’ perceptions of reality and judgments of issues. Gibson and Zillmann 
studied amusement park stories about safety with direct quotes and stories with indirect quotes or 
no quotes at all. “Respondents presented with print news reports about amusement park safety 





perception of the issue than those presented with indirect testimony or no testimony at all” (p. 
799).  Gibson and Zillmann also state that since direct quotation has been shown to greatly 
influence readers’ perceptions of issues, the use of imbalanced quotations in testimony can be an 
effective way to sway readers’ opinions to one side of an issue without the readers even realizing 
that the quotation they just read was one sided. Journalists have the power to choose which 
points of view they want to represent in their stories, and the use of direct quotations makes that 
representation that much stronger.  
 
Framing: The Use of Disaster Myths 
Disaster myths are based on the assumed behaviors humans display after catastrophic 
events. Disaster myths, as stated by Quarantelli and Dynes (1972) are the popular images of how 
people behave in disasters and are based on flawed assumptions about the frailty of the human 
personality and the social organization. Disaster myths have long been a focus of research; as 
early as 1920 (Prince, 1920), research showed that the human response to disaster is controlled 
and rational (Fritz, 1961; Quarantelli and Dynes, 1972; Fischer, 1994), not the assumed behavior 
that disaster myths suggest. Over the past few decades, researchers have compiled a number of 
myths believed to be perpetuated by the media: panic flight, looting, price gouging, contagion, 
martial law, psychological dependency, disaster shock, evacuation behavior, and shelter 
utilization (Wenger & Friedman, 1986; Goltz, 1984; Wenger, 1985; Fischer, 1994; Quarantelli & 
Dynes, 1972).  However, this study will focus on only five: panic flight, looting, psychological 
dependency, disaster shock, and evacuation behavior. These five were chosen because research 
suggests they are the most commonly mentioned myths in disaster coverage (Wenger & 






Panic flight is a myth about how the individuals act in a crisis (Fischer, 1994). Defined by 
Pastel (2001), panic is “an acute fear reaction marked by loss of self-control which is followed 
by nonsocial and nonrational flight” (p. 44). It is believed that when a disaster occurs victims 
will panic and engage in any behavior they deem necessary to escape. This panic flight is 
thought to be a natural instinct among people in times of crisis, similar to the fight or flight 
response. During panic flight it is assumed people will be running in every direction in an 
irrational manner. Belief in this myth can lead to delayed evacuations because officials want to 
wait until the evacuation is absolutely necessary to avoid this panic (Fischer, 1994). However, 
disaster research (Drabek, 1968; Quarantelli, 1981) has shown that people do not panic and try to 
flee regardless of whether there is a known escape route. Instead, people tend to wait for 
information about the situation before acting, and they will look to others for help when 
interpreting cues about potential threats (Sunseri, 2005). Further evidencing a lack of panic flight 
in crisis situations, Fahy, Proulx, and Aimen (2010) investigated the myth and its origins in 
detail, citing the news media and movies as being sources in how the public sees events, 
perpetuating such myths as panic flight. Fahy et al. studied 745 media accounts from 435 
survivors from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and found that the overall impression 
those survivors had of themselves and those around them was that people acted calm and orderly 
(57 percent) while media accounts suggested otherwise.  
Citing a recent event, the 2009 emergency landing of flight 1549 in the Hudson River, 
Fahy, et al., demonstrated that panic is seldom a behavior of those in a crisis. Fahy et al., 
described a news interview with Wolf Blitzer of CNN where he asked a passenger if a sort of 





in Fahy et al.’s investigation of the news media coverage of the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks, they found a BBC online news article headline “Panic on the Stairs.” When investigated 
closely by Fahy et al., the quote to which the headline is referring is actually an account of a 
survivor describing the stairwells and elevators as being crowded; the survivor said nothing 
about panic. One survivor was quoted as saying that those in the stairwells “maintained their 
calm really well” and went on to say that “A couple of people started crying a little, but we said, 
‘We’re going to get out of here, we just have to take it one step at a time.’ It wasn’t quiet, people 
were talking – in fact someone was laughing, it was pretty normal” (p. 396). Scanlon (2007) and 
Goltz (1984) both argue that panic is so rare in the aftermath of a disaster that it can be very 
difficult and almost impossible to study.  
 
Looting 
Looting is the most expected behavioral response to a disaster (Fischer, 1994), with both 
print and broadcast media reporting looting incidents. The term looting has military roots and 
implies that the invading army will take property by force, generally when the owner cannot 
protect it (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1972). Looting may be reported as people taking items that are 
not necessary for immediate survival and are instead used for personal gain, monetary or 
otherwise. The perpetuation of this myth has led to National Guard troops being called in to 
prevent crime and has led to countless more deaths due to people being unwilling to leave their 
properties during disaster because of fear they will lose their belongings. 
As early as 1956, researchers Fritz and Mathewson concluded that the number of verified 
cases of looting in peacetime disasters, in both the United States and foreign countries, was very 





instances of looting, citing a National Opinion Research Center (NORC) study that was 
conducted after a tornado in Arkansas in 1952. A random sample of people affected was asked if 
they had lost property due to looting. Only nine percent reported that they or someone in their 
household had lost property to looters. Additionally, one-third of that nine percent was actually 
uncertain whether the loss was due to looting or if the items simply blew away or became buried 
in debris.  
Quarantelli and Dynes reference other studies conducted outside the United States that 
also confirm the rarity of looting. One such case was a study conducted after a flood in the 
Netherlands in 1953. There were reports of looting; however, law enforcement agencies were 
unable to find a single verified case of looting. In fact, it has been found that major crime rates 
fall in the aftermath of a disaster (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1972).  
 
Psychological Dependency 
The scene after a disaster where victims are assumed to be “out of it,” not knowing what 
to do and are perceived to need some form of direction, is known as the psychological 
dependency myth (Fischer, 1994). In this myth it is commonly believed that survivors are 
incapable of functioning after their experience. This myth encourages people to think that 
outsiders need to come in to organize search-and-rescue efforts, make damage assessments, 
assist the injured, and begin the cleanup. Quarantelli and Dynes (1972) stated that it is believed 
by the general population that people are devoid of any initiative and are reliant on others, when 
in reality disaster victims will insist on taking care of themselves. Also, disaster victims are 
active and will not wait for outsiders to help. Survivors often take care of themselves before 





1953 on the Flint-Beecher tornado. Survivors had almost no aid from organizations and within 
four hours were able to rescue and bring to the hospitals two-thirds to three-fourths of the 927 
casualties. The study also found that less than 20 percent of the population affected by the 
disaster had any contact with disaster agencies during the early hours of the disaster.  
An example of how believing this myth can affect a community can be seen in Erikson’s 
(1976) story of the Buffalo Creek disaster. Erikson described how outsiders took over and did 
not allow community members to make their own decisions on how to rebuild and where, which 
greatly affected the very tight-knit community that was Buffalo Creek before the disaster struck.   
 
Disaster Shock 
Disaster shock, also known as “disaster syndrome” is a myth that goes hand in hand with 
the psychological dependency myth. Disaster shock is where survivors are perceived as being in 
shock after their experience with the disaster (Fischer, 1994). The media accounts illustrating 
this myth are often third-person reports that describe survivors walking around aimlessly not 
knowing what to do or where to go (Fischer, 1994). More often than not, survivors may appear to 
be in shock, when in reality they are actually just exhausted. For example, researchers (Perry, 
Lindell, & Greene, 1981; Fischer, 1988; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1972) have found that survivors 
are in fact not apathetic or lost in a trance. They are often the first to respond to their needs and 
needs of their neighbors. Also, they remain calm and do not panic.  
 
Evacuation Behavior 
The evacuation behavior myth refers to group level panic. It is the myth that if there is an 





other, driving each other off roads to escape the imminent danger of a disaster. This is another 
situation where deviant behavior is assumed to be the norm. Hollywood versions of disasters 
typically portray disasters as happening in mass chaos with pushing and shoving (Quarantelli, 
1985). This idea has permeated all levels of American society wherein everyone from average 
citizens and media outlets to government officials and even many emergency management 
agencies believe it (Fischer, 1994); unfortunately, these beliefs can cause delayed evacuation 
orders (Fischer, 1994). 
 
All of the above mentioned myths are constantly perpetuated in popular culture, 
reinforcing the misperception that they exist. Reporters may use these myths in their stories, 
especially when they have no evidence to contradict them. For example, one year after Hurricane 
Katrina, Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski (2006) investigated the consequences of the media 
frames after the hurricane struck. Through their analysis of both media reporting and official 
discourse of Hurricane Katrina, the researchers found that the media upheld the myth that 
disasters result in lawlessness and social breakdown. Tierney et al. (2006) point out that these 
disaster myths are harmful not only because they are false, but because of their potential for 
influencing organizational, governmental, and public response during disasters. These disaster 
myths may impede effective disaster response, for example, the misallocation of public safety 
resources may occur due to the use of these myths.  
 
While news coverage suggests people act in accordance with these myths, evidence 
indicates that people in fact act quite differently; in some instances, the media do report on 





Media coverage of the 1995 Kobe, Japan, earthquake that killed approximately 5,500 people and 
injured approximately 36,000 more displayed the concept of altruism.  In a Newsweek article that 
ran the week after the earthquake, reporter Sharon Begely discussed the acts of altruism that took 
place after the earthquake as she reported that Japan’s largest organized crime syndicate was 
very generous by dispensing food and water from its Kobe headquarters (Begley, 1995). An 
article in the May 1995 issue of Look Japan also discussed the idea of altruism by reporting 
about the large amount of altruism that was seen in the hours after the earthquake struck 
(Nishimura, 1995). Solnit (2009) also wrote about altruism in her book about the extraordinary 
communities that arise in times of disaster. She analyzed a few different disasters in her book 
including the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, the Halifax explosion in 1917, and Hurricane 
Katrina; in each of the affected communities she found that people displayed altruism. In San 
Francisco survivors who were able to cook and set up shelters did so for themselves and for 
those who could not help themselves. After the explosion in Halifax, it was common to hear of 
people helping each other, regardless of occupation, or any other kind of social status marker. 
After Hurricane Katrina, Solnit gives the account of a husband and wife going through their 
parish looking for survivors by boat, saving about a hundred people that first day.  
 
The Phenomenon of Media Hype 
The concept of media hype has only recently been studied. Vasterman (2005) has been at 
the forefront of this research. He defines media hype as: 
a media generated, wall-to-wall news wave, triggered by one specific event and enlarged 
by the self-reinforcing process within the news production of the media. During a media 
hype, the sharp rise in news stories is the result of making news, instead of reporting 
news events, and covering media-triggered social responses, instead of reporting 






According to Vasterman (2005) the media coverage during a media hype is the most 
intense a few days after the trigger event, then it slowly fades, possibly regaining momentum 
through follow-up stories. Wien and Elmelund-Praestekaer (2009) state that the rise and fall of 
coverage during a media hype happens approximately three times and that media hypes last 
about three weeks. The initial onset of a hype will eventually die because editors and reporters 
feel readers have lost interest so they move on to the next top story that will hold their readers’ 
attention. The following two rises in coverage can come from a follow-up story that generates 
enough interest or new developments in the story (Vasterman, 2005; Wein & Elmelund-
Praestekaer, 2009). 
According to Vasterman (2005), media hypes are a form of agenda setting. Media hypes 
begin with trigger events, which are defined by their magnitude and intensity of coverage of a 
particular issue. The trigger event must be so newsworthy that it essentially blocks the agenda for 
other stories. Trigger events are unusual events in which the media will increase their attention 
on, and will enlarge the event with their non-stop coverage, evoking social responses that will 
eventually become news as well, and further stimulate the news wave (Vasterman, 2005). These 
waves become so popular that they can make some events seem as if there is a crisis. Vasterman 
(2005) stated “Due to media hype, a social problem can appear to reach crisis proportions, 
forcing social actors, especially the authorities, to take drastic and hasty action” (p. 526). For 
example, the high level of media coverage after Hurricane Katrina that reported on so-called 
looting resulted in the governor changing the mission of the National Guard troops from search-
and-rescue to protect-and-serve (Solnit, 2009), when in fact looting was almost non-existent. 
Vasterman (2005) wrote “Media hypes are created on the basis of one frame that guides 





During a media hype, the news media have the tendency to lower the news threshold because the 
themes are so impactful. Lowering the news threshold means that all statements, opinions, and 
sources related to the theme(s) are reported because they are in line with the current theme(s). 
Eventually, this lowering of the news threshold leads thematically related news conforming to 
the chosen frame being reported while other facts and opinions are neglected.  
Wien and Elmelund-Praestekaer (2009) investigate media hypes within Danish 
newspapers. They investigated five Danish media hypes occurring between 2000 and 2005. Their 
study showed that not every event has the potential to trigger a media hype; the events must 
satisfy general news values but also contain some violation of norms that are suitable for public 
debate, and the media must be able to cover the event from many perspectives.   
Vasterman, Yzermans, and Dirkwager (2005) studied the effect of the media hyping in 
the aftermath of disasters, particularly its effect on health perception and personal well-being. 
They investigated the impact of media hypes on town residents’ health perceptions after the 
October 4, 1992, Bijlmermeer neighborhood plane crash in a densely populated part of 
Amsterdam that killed 39 residents and the four crew members of the El Al Boeing 747. 
According to the researchers, even though the cause of the crash was determined quickly (bad 
locking pins caused two engines to break away from the fuselage), the crash became a drawn-out 
event fueled by speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories surrounding purported toxic 
substances on board the plane. There were rumors of involvement of secret intelligence agencies, 
and the government’s contradictory actions in many instances throughout the investigation 
fueled the rumors and conspiracy theories. The researchers’ analysis showed that media hypes 
developed each time new pieces of information arose that reinforced the frame that there was a 





the plane crash. These increases in media coverage were followed by increases in the number of 
townspeople complaining of health effects. Between 1992 and 1999, complaints rose from 2,000 
to 6,430.  
 
Culture’s Influence on News 
 As discussed earlier, the news media tend to convey inaccurate information when forced 
into a secondary role or when on a tight deadline. Reporters will rely on their own knowledge 
and beliefs to make sense of the situation. The knowledge and beliefs reporters use reflect their 
own cultures and education. 
Culture has many definitions; a study done in 1962 found that there were more than 160 
definitions of culture (Ferraro & Andreatta, 2012).  In broad terms, culture can be defined as the 
values, beliefs and practices of an observed society. Definitions from varying fields, such as 
sociology and psychology offer some rather detailed definitions. Erikson (1976), a sociologist 
who is well known for his work in the disaster field defined culture as follows:  
…it is used throughout the social sciences to refer to those modes of thinking and 
knowing and doing that a people learn to regard as natural, those beliefs and attitudes that 
help shape a people’s way of looking at themselves and the rest of the universe, those 
ideas and symbols that a people employ to make sense of their own everyday experience 
as members of a society. (p. 79) 
 
Hofstede (1984) a social psychologist most well-known for his work in the area of 
management and culture, provides another definition of culture. Hofstede (1984) defines culture 
as such: 
…the collective programming of the mind distinguishing the members of one group or 
society from those of another ….Culture is reflected in the meanings people attach to 
various aspects of life; their way of looking at the world and their role in it; in their 
values, that is, in what they consider as ‘good’ and as ‘evil’; in their collective beliefs, 





consider as ‘beautiful’ and as ‘ugly’. Culture, although basically resident in people's 
minds, becomes crystallized in the institutions and tangible products of a society, which 
reinforce the mental programs in their turn. (p. 82) 
  
In his definition, Hofstede stresses that culture is (a) a collective, not individual, attribute; 
(b) not directly visible but manifested in behaviors; and (c) common to some but not all people 
(Hofestede & McCrae, 2004). However, for the purposes of this study, it is important to find a 
definition from a field with more experience in defining culture since it is a key aspect to the 
differences in the news reporting of both Japan and the United States. This research will focus on 
an anthropological understanding of culture, allowing for a much broader view of culture to be 
taken. Tylor (1958), an early anthropologist defined culture as “that complex whole which 
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society” (p.1). In 1971, Downs defined culture as being a 
mental map that guides us in our relations to our surroundings and to other people (Ferraro & 
Andreatta, 2012). Hatch (1985) defined culture simply as the way of life of a people. Lavenda 
and Schultz (2007) defined culture as the “sum total of all the customs and practices humans 
have ever produced” (p. 28). More recently, anthropologists Ferraro and Andreatta (2012) 
defined culture as “everything that people have, think, and do as members in a society” (p. 29). 
For this paper, the definition given by Ferraro and Andreatta will be used because what people 
have, think, and do correspond to the three major components of culture discussed earlier 
(values, beliefs, and practices). Everyone has material possessions, everything that people think 
refers to the ideas, values, and attitudes they carry around in their head; and everything people do 
refers their behavior patterns (Ferraro & Andreatta, 2012). No person and no locations are 





which must be taken into account when analyzing the relationship between the media and 
culture. 
 
Hofstede’s Five Dimensions 
Hofstede (1980) completed a study dealing with national cultural differences that used a 
multinational database collected from the IBM Corporation and its subsidiaries in 71 countries. 
This study included scores from 117,000 employee attitude surveys completed between 1967 and 
1973. From Hofstede’s data, he identified four dimensions of national culture: 1) power distance, 
2) uncertainty avoidance, 3) individualism, and 4) masculinity. Later, a fifth dimension was 
added, long-term versus short-term orientation. Each dimension is measured on a 100-point 
scale. Hofstede (1984) stated that these dimensions “represent elements of common structure in 
the cultural systems of the countries” (p. 83). These dimensions will help in understanding some 
of the cultural differences between the United States and Japan. 
 
Power Distance 
Power distance, as defined by Hofstede and McCrae (2004), is the extent to which the 
less powerful members of organizations and institutions will expect that the power within those 
organizations and institutions is distributed unequally. Power distance suggests that the level of 
inequality in a society will be endorsed as much by the followers as it is by the leaders. Hofstede 
and McCrae argued that a society’s power distance level originates in the families of a society, 
through the extent to which children are socialized either toward obedience or toward initiative. 
Hofstede (1984) stated that the fundamental issue being addressed by the power distance 





Within the dimension of power distance, there are two categories that a society can fall 
into: small and large. Hofstede (1984) stated that people in a large power distance society will 
accept a hierarchical order wherein everybody has a place in that society that will not need a 
further justification. On the other hand, people in small power distance societies will strive for 
equalization of power, and they will demand justification of power inequalities.  
Countries that are considered as large power distance societies are Malaysia (104) and 
Guatemala (95). Countries considered as having small power distances are Austria (11), Israel 
(13) and Denmark (18). The United States scored a 40 on this scale, ranking at number 38 of 50 
countries and three regions. Japan scored a 54, ranking number 33 on the scale. Based on this 
scale, Hofstede concluded that the power distance dimension separates the more economically 
developed countries from the less developed countries. Smaller power distance societies are 
found in more developed countries and larger power distance societies are found in less 
developed countries.  
 Hofstede (2001) also stated that in societies with a small Power Distance Index (PDI), 
power is something that leaders are almost ashamed of, and they will try to downplay their 
power. On the other hand, in a society with a large power distance, inequality is seen as the basis 
for societal order. “Both low [small]- and high [large] PDI countries have hierarchies, but on the 
low- PDI side this is an arrangement of convenience. On the high- PDI side the hierarchy is 
existential: Superiors are seen as superior persons” (p. 97).  
 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance was the second dimension identified by Hofstede (1980; 2001) in 





uncertainty avoidance as a dimension of national culture as “The extent to which the members of 
a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations” (p. 161).Uncertainty avoidance is a 
society’s level of tolerance for ambiguity. This dimension indicates the extent to which a culture 
can make its members feel comfortable in situations lacking structure. Unstructured situations 
are not planned and can even be surprising. Uncertainty-avoiding cultures will avoid these types 
of situations by applying strict laws and rules, and employing safety and security measures. 
Hofstede (2001) states that the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) norm represents a value 
system shared by the middle class. Hofstede (2001) further states “The UAI norm deals 
fundamentally with the level of anxiety about the future in a country and the consequent need to 
protect society through three kinds of measures: technology, rules, and rituals” (p. 159). In other 
words, the higher the anxiety, the higher the level of stress with a more hurried social life, which 
can also lead to a higher energy release that will result in an inner urge to be busy. The higher the 
UAI, the more people will show their emotions and will demonstrate a higher level of 
conservatism and desire for law and order. A higher UAI also indicates there is a higher fear of 
all things foreign, and those in societies with a high UAI feel powerless towards external forces. 
If the UAI is lower in a society, the anxiety is found to be released more passively and the 
emotions are more controlled. Those countries with a lower UAI are found to be more open to 
change and new ideas resulting in a more openness to diversity. Hofstede and McCrae (2004) 
describe people in societies with a higher UAI as being more emotional and motivated by inner 
nervous energy.  
According to Hofstede (1984; 2001), examples of societies that have high uncertainty 
avoidances are Greece (112), Guatemala (101), and Belgium (94). These are societies that 





avoidance are Singapore (8), Jamaica (13), and Denmark (23). The United States has a lower 
uncertainty avoidance, ranking 43
rd
, scoring 46, than Japan which ranks 7
th
, scoring 92, meaning 
Japan shows more acceptance towards a structured or rigid society than does the United States; 
in other words, Japan tries to avoid situations that lack any kind of structure.  
 
Individualism and Collectivism 
The next dimension Hofstede (1984) identified was individualism. He described it as the 
degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. Hofstede (1984) described the 
fundamental issue addressed by this dimension as the degree of interdependence within a society 
and related it to the concept of “I” versus “we.” In societies considered to be individualistic, the 
ties between individuals are fairly loose. In this type of society, it is expected that people look 
after themselves and their immediate families. The opposite of individualism is collectivism. A 
collectivistic society has a tightly knit social framework; people are integrated from birth onward 
into cohesive in-groups. These in-groups are often extended families that offer protection with 
unquestioning loyalty. 
According to Hofstede (1980, 1998), people from individualistic societies are more 
inclined to put their own interests and those of their immediate family ahead of social concerns. 
Within individualistic societies, it is believed that people can do anything they want and achieve 
all of their goals. In addition, individual achievement is considered more important than group 
achievement. Those that scored the highest on Hofstede’s scale in this dimension are Great 
Britain (89), Australia (90) and the United States, which scored the highest on the scale, 91. 
In a collectivistic society people are born into in-groups, expected to care for one another 





priority over the individual’s needs. Hofstede has categorized Eastern countries as collectivistic, 
such as Korea (18) and China (20). On Hofstede’s scale, Panama (11), Equador (8), and 
Guatemala (6) ranked in the top three for collectivistic societies. Japan and Argentina both 
scored a 46 on the scale.   
 
Masculinity and Femininity 
The fourth dimension Hofstede (1984) identified was masculinity. Hofstede described 
masculinity as there being a preference in a society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and 
material success. Femininity, the opposite pole, is described as a preference for relationships, 
modesty, caring for the weak, and caring for the quality of life. Hofstede argued that the 
fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is the way that a society allocates social roles to 
the sexes. Hofstede and McCrae (2004) stated: “The IBM studies revealed that (a) women’s 
values differ less among societies than men’s values; and (b) men’s values vary along a 
dimension from very assertive and competitive and maximally different from women’s values on 
one side to modest and caring and similar to women’s values on the other” (Hofstede & McCrae, 
2004, p. 63 ). Values are defined as “a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over 
others” (2001, p. 5). Hofstede (2001) further explained that “values are feelings with arrows to 
them: each has a plus minus pole” and deal with such things as evil versus good, dirty versus 
clean, ugly versus beautiful, etc. (p. 6).  
Within the masculinity dimension, Hofstede (1984) discusses two differentiations: 
Maximum-social-differentiation and minimal-social-differentiation between the sexes. 
Maximum-social-differentiation societies will use an assertive mentality in their institutions. 





societies, according to Hofstede’s scale, are Venezuela (73), Austria (79), and Japan, where 
Japan ranked first with a score of 95, making it the most masculine country on Hofstede’s scale.  
Minimal-social-differentiation societies are societies where women may take assertive 
roles. Also, in these societies, men can take the relationship-oriented, modest, and caring roles. 
These societies, Hofstede states, “will permeate their institutions with a caring, quality of life 
mentality” (p. 84). Examples of these societies are the Netherlands (51), Norway (52), and 
Sweden (53). The United States scored a 62 and ranked 36
th
 on Hofstede’s scale, putting it 
somewhere in the middle. 
 
Long- Versus Short-term Orientation 
This dimension was the last to be added to Hofstede’s dimensions in 1985 and was added 
in an effort to distinguish Eastern thought from Western thought. Hofstede used an instrument 
that was developed by Michael Harris Bond in Hong Kong. Bond used values suggested by 
Chinese scholars, in an effort to remove the bias in Hofstede’s initial survey; the initial survey 
caused some confusion for non-Western respondents. The Chinese Value Survey that was 
developed by Bond was later adopted by Hofstede and included 40 items of fundamental and 
basic values for Chinese people (Hofstede, 2001).  
Originally the survey was administered to only 23 countries, both Asian and non-Asian, 
and not all that were originally included in the IBM study.  
Values associated with a long-term orientation society are thrift and perseverance; values 
associated with a short-term orientation society are respect for tradition, fulfilling social 
obligations, and protecting one’s “face” (reputation) (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004). Hofstede and 





influenced by Confucian thought. These countries shared the values of persistence, thrift, having 
a sense of shame, and family hierarchy, i.e., elders hold more power and deserve to be respected. 
The results of the Chinese Value Survey also showed people in these cultures believed in treating 
others as they would want to be treated and living a patient, persevering, and hard-working life. 
Countries that show a long-term orientation are China (118), Hong Kong (96), and Taiwan (87). 
Japan scored an 80 on the scale, showing that this country’s culture has a long-term orientation 
as well. 
On the other side of this spectrum, the short-term orientation emphasizes individualism 
and finding fulfillment through creativity and self-actualization. Some of the more specific 
characteristics are personal stability, protecting your reputation, and the reciprocation of 
greetings, favors, and gifts. Examples of countries that have a short-term orientation are West 
Africa (16), the Czech Republic (13), and Pakistan, which scored a 0 on Hofstede’s scale. The 
United States scored a 29, leaving it somewhere in the middle of those countries surveyed on this 
dimension. 
 
Understanding the five cultural dimensions discussed by Hofstede (1984) and Hofstede 
and McCrae (2004) can help guide the understanding of how culture can affect the frames used 
in the news media. As Wilhelm and Sabine (2005) stated in their study about the framing of the 
Iraq war, “Although media occupy an independent role in the creation of agendas, they serve as 
cultural time capsules that offer a brief glimpse of mainly political symbols, myths and stories 
which are popular at a particular time and space” (p. 4). Cultures, even as learned as they may 
be, change over time. The media document what the cultural beliefs are at the particular point in 





Goffman (1981) stated: “Frames are a central part of a culture and are institutionalized in 
various ways” (p. 63). Likewise, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) stated: “media content is both that 
[content as a manifestation of culture] and a source of culture. That is, media content takes 
elements of culture, magnifies them, frames them, and feeds them back to an audience. Media 
impose their own logic in creating a symbolic environment” (p. 60).  
 
Hofstede’s five dimensions are heavily cited in many different disciplines including the 
communication research field. However, his research has also been criticized. A brief critique of 
Hofstede’s work follows.  
A heavy reliance on Hofstede’s research may lead to the perpetuation of stereotypes due 
to the broadness of the dimensions he found; they tend to generalize entire nations’ cultures, 
often times ignoring important subcultures and the changes that occur within societies and 
cultures. McSweeney (2002) notes that, even though Hofstede has added to his model, he has 
never acknowledged any significant errors or weaknesses in his research. This is an issue 
because, as will be discussed, there are weaknesses that need to be addressed. First and foremost, 
Hofstede’s data were extracted from a bank of pre-existing attitude surveys taken by employees 
at IBM and its subsidiaries around 1967-1969 and again around 1971- 1973. There are three 
main criticisms that will be discussed: the data’s generalizability is limited, the work is dated, 
and Hofstede’s methods of measurement are problematic.  
 The generalizability of Hofstede’s (1980) data is limited because of the sample used. 
Respondents were only from the marketing division within each IBM subsidiary. Ailon (2008) 
stated: “‘National society’ was reduced to middle class rather than the working class, which was 





 In addition, McSweeney argues that Hofestede’s sample, though large (approximately 
117,000 participants) does not even accurately represent the marketing divisions of IBM 
subsidiaries within various countries. For example, in more than 15 countries surveyed there 
were less than 200 respondents. Pakistan only had 107 respondents, and Singapore only had 58 
respondents.  
The generalizability was further jeopardized because respondents knew what the survey 
was initially going to be used for (managers were expected to develop strategies for corrective 
actions that the survey showed to be necessary) which, may have influenced answers 
(McSweeney, 2002).   
Further, Hofstede (1980) makes claims about the cultures of nations, stating that 
regardless of the divisions that may be found within each nation, every national population 
somehow shares a unique culture. McSweeny (2002) takes issues with this assertion and notes 
that even though Great Britain is composed of three nations (England, Scotland, and Wales) 
Hofstede treats them as one entity having a single “national” culture. 
Researchers have also questioned whether Hofstede’s conclusions are still valid because 
some of the data is more than 40 years old; this can lead to the conclusion that Hofstede’s work 
is dated. McSweeney (2002) suggests that it is time to investigate other studies’ abilities to 
investigate culture. A study that was done over 40 years ago is a long time ago, especially in 
terms of culture. Some countries have gone through vast changes over the years, potentially 
making Hofstede’s findings no longer relevant.    
 Hofstede’s method of measurement and conceptual idea of culture was also problematic 
in his study. Ailon (2008) investigated Hofstede’s work finding that “Culture was reduced to 





Ailon (2008) noted that each cultural dimension that was found was found by using only two or 
three survey questions. For example, the dimension of power distance was formed from only 
three questions and these questions were specific to the workplace. The first question used a five-
point scale to rate how frequently in their experience as employees were they afraid to express 
disagreement with their managers. The second and third questions defined four types of 
managers and asked respondents to state which type they preferred and which of those types they 
thought their bosses were.  
 These criticisms of Hofstede’s work have created another aspect of my study, allowing 
me to investigate whether or not Hofstede’s assertions of national cultures still hold true today. 
These criticisms affected how much Hofstede’s work was actually relied upon in this study. 
Further research was done involving both American and Japanese cultures in an effort to support 
or disprove Hofstede’s assertions.  
 
 
American Culture and Media Coverage of Disasters  
 
It was dreams of riches and religious freedom that America was built upon. The British 
Americans broke to form a new nation in the 1770s and in 1776 Thomas Jefferson wrote that a 
man’s rights included life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. By 1832 the notion that “We are 
a nation of self-made men” was common (Meachum, 2012).  
The idea of the American Dream was introduced by James Truslow Adams in his book 
The Epic of America (1931) but was understood as early as the 1880s, as is evident in Mark 
Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1885). The Dream is about liberty, prosperity, and 
stability, but also about escape and reinvention.  The reinvention of the British Americans and 





impulse among Americans and an essential element in the American Dream (Meachum, 2012).  
Meachum (2012) states: “The allure of the belief in the individual’s capacity to make his way—
to cross oceans or mountains—only grew stronger as America grew older” (p. 33). 
The United States Constitution and Bill of Rights came into effect as Constitutional 
Amendments on December 15, 1791, giving Americans the freedom of press and speech. This 
freedom of press plays a large role in the shaping of the American culture because it allows more 
people a voice, the opportunity to make this country what they, the people, want. These beliefs, 
values, and notions have defined what it means to be American; the American Dream is still a 
strong notion in the minds of many.  
According to Hofstede (1980; 1984; 1998; 2001), compared to the Japanese, the 
Americans have a smaller power distance; meaning people in America strive for equalization of 
power, and demand justification of power inequalities. Equality has been an issue throughout 
American history. The American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) has been making a push 
to make newsrooms more diverse since 1978 with a long term goal of matching the percentage of 
minorities in communities with the percentage of minorities working in newsrooms (Hardin & 
Whiteside, 2006). The ASNE’s continued push for diversity in the newsroom reflects a battle 
within one industry in the United States that has not given up the fight for equality.  
Though diversity isn’t where many would like to see it, it is still much more common 
than 30 years ago to see both men and women, ranging in ages, race, and ethnicity running 
newsrooms, writing articles and reporting on every topic imaginable. This may not be the case in 
every industry, but as demonstrated by Hofstede (1980; 1984; 1998; 2001), American society 





power distance helps to explain why the United States is more uncertainty accepting and less 
masculine overall.  
According to Hofstede (1980; 1984; 1998; 2001), the United States is more accepting of 
uncertainty. This may be because as soon as an event occurs, the news media are there to cover 
it, and there is almost always someone who will come out and say, “We have everything under 
control,” or a statement about what is being done to help victims, or control the gas leak, 
wildfire, or gunman.  
Americans are creative, individualistic, and at times impatient (they want change now) 
(Hofstede, 1980; 1984; 1998; 2001). This wanting of immediacy and self-actualization are what 
make the United States more short-term oriented than long-term where many Asian countries 
like Japan fall. It is more common for Americans to focus on making their own ways in life 
rather than focusing on going through life with their family. While family is important, children 
are not expected to stay at home and take care of their parents; children are expected to go out 
and make something of their own lives and support themselves. In the American media system 
this dimension is exhibited in reporting. Reporters are responsible for themselves, going out and 
finding the stories and the sources themselves.  
 
The American Media Structure 
 The media in America consists of hundreds of daily and weekly newspapers, as well as 
numerous magazines and broadcast news shows. This smorgasbord of media provides seemingly 
unlimited choices.  
The U.S. media is based on a market model (Croteau & Hoynes, 2006). The market 





like all other goods and services (Croteau & Hoynes, 2006).  The media are primarily made up of 
commercial, profit-seeking companies; they issue stock, compete for larger shares, develop new 
products, watch costs, look for opportunities to expand, just as any other business would.  
 
American Media Coverage of Disasters 
Historically, coverage of disasters allowed people a look at another world; it gave people 
something to talk about. Disaster coverage was exciting and different. People wanted to know 
what happened, and U.S. newspapers realized that these crises could help sell more newspapers. 
So, when disaster struck, journalists were there to cover them. An aspect of the rising popularity 
of disasters was the pictures that ran with the stories. Pictures of disasters had an enormous 
impact on how viewers would come to see and experience floods, storms, fires, and the like 
(Rozario, 2007). By 1955, mass communications in the wake of disasters was commonplace.  
“Spectacle was the ascendant. Americans were coming to demand and expect 
photographs or live footage with their ‘news,’ whether in newspapers, in enormously 
popular magazines such as Life, or on television, a new medium that was well on its way 
to becoming the nation’s primary source of entertainment as well as of information about 
current events. And disasters were securely established at the center of the news-
gathering enterprise.” (Rozario, 2007, p. 136)  
 
It was also during this time that Warner Brothers newsreels became popular and were 
viewed as a heroic model of disaster reporting by showing footage of different disasters with 
narration. In this heroic model of disaster reporting, producers were “Proud to present” their 
footage of the most recent disaster, showcasing the technological and institutional advances of 
the time, instilling in many that control over these disasters, such as natural disasters, was within 
reach. For example, one 1955 newsreel showed President Dwight Eisenhower on an airplane 





narrator described what was going on stated that the president leads a “shocked nation” in one of 
the worst disasters in American history. The video showed the floodwaters and then showed 
Eisenhower viewing the disaster through an airplane window. This newsreel, as well as many 
others, was produced for cinematic effect (Rozario, 2007). President Eisenhower hired a team of 
media consultants who were skilled in the areas of lighting, cosmetics, and studio direction; a 
celebrity actor was even hired to help Eisenhower project the trustworthiness and strength 
needed of a president in a time of tragedy.  
From the newsreels and newspaper stories, disasters became popular movie themes 
including end-of-the-world themes (Deep Impact, Armageddon, and Knowing), natural disaster 
themes (Twister, Volcano, and The Day after tomorrow), and technological disasters (Titanic, 
The Towering Inferno, and Outbreak), to name a few. Through framing, agenda setting, and 
priming the news media helped to strengthen the modern understanding and response to 
disasters. “Disasters would continue to be sites where the meaning of America was debated and 
contested, where modern American values and social arrangements were articulated and 
assembled” (Rozario, 2007, p. 142).  
According to Rozario, after the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire, people were 
excited for the earthquake; they wanted more destruction, some even watched the burning of the 
city as if it were some kind of entertainment. Rozario believed that this response was due to 
people openly reacting against the Victorian personal prohibitions. The earthquake and fire were 
a welcome cultural interruption; opening the eyes of many to a world that was not so controlled.  
This disaster and others had high public appeal, so high that amusement parks in Coney 
Island, New York, set up rides and entertainment based off of different disasters. One such show 





volcanic eruption that killed 40,000 people. Some of the other entertainment was reproductions 
of the Johnstown, Pennsylvania, flood of 1889, the Galveston Hurricane of 1900, and the 
eruption of Mount Pele that killed 30,000 people on the island of Martinique in 1902. These 
disasters and their reproductions were, as Theodore Waters observed in a 1904 Harper’s Weekly, 
an emotion that audiences were willing to pay for; customers wanted stimulation for not only the 
eyes but for all of their senses, and reliving disasters was a good way to do this (Rozario, 2007). 
These rides were a precursor to what modern American popular culture would involve, including 
an entire genre of thrill, adventure and horror movies, and new thrilling amusement parks with 
vertical roller coasters and other rides.  
  This culture of being enthralled with disasters, reliving them through various forms of 
entertainment, watching hours of live coverage on the television, reading the latest developments 
of disasters online, has been the ways in which people came to cope and experience disasters. 
Americans believe that the rebuild will be bigger and better, learning from the destruction what 
works and what does not. This idea of creative destruction runs strong throughout American 
culture through the government and through the people (Rozario, 2007). The destroyed city will 
rise again, bigger and better. Disasters allow for the chance to make something better and to 
allow people to rise from the devastation time and again.   
 
Japanese Culture and Media Coverage of Disasters  
 Understanding Japan’s rich history is the key to understanding contemporary Japan. In 
1868 the Meiji Restoration set Japan on the path towards modernization when the Tokugawa 
shogunal government was replaced by a regime that centered on the emperor (Bestor, Bestor, & 





integrity but it also wanted to achieve an equal standing with the Western nations. Therefore, the 
regime focused on adopting Western technologies and institutions in an effort to achieve that 
level of standing. Japan’s defeat in World War II was another crossroads for the nation, as many 
social institutions, practices, and public attitudes were changed or realigned in an effort to break 
from the prewar and wartime social norms of authoritarian militarism and rigid hierarchy in the 
service of imperialism.  
During Japan’s transition from a predominantly agrarian (1868) society to an industrial 
society (1912), the mass media played a large role. By the 1950s the Japanese nation was 
transformed, and 20 years after World War II, with the help of the media, Japan was considered 
one of the most powerful industrial countries in the world. The nation with foundations in a 
strong work ethic, cooperation, and conformity reemerged after the war. Urbanization occured 
rapidly, and by 1970, Japan was considered an “economic miracle”; Japan was now an economic 
superpower. However, by the 1990s, Japan’s economic miracle was over; the bubble years, as 
the years referring to the time in Japan when the economy was on its way up and at its strongest 
were called, caused a collapse in the stock market and real estate market. The long recession that 
started then continues today. 
The Japanese have freedom of speech guaranteed to them under Article 21 of the 
Japanese constitution, and, in 1999, the Freedom of Information Bill was passed (McCargo, 
2003). However, the country’s journalistic practices may not reflect the freedom of speech, as 
censorship still plays a large role in the current media system. Censorship comes mainly in the 
form of the popular press clubs that have run the media since approximately 1908, not to 





Japan has been known for its uniformity of information and the bland way in which the 
information is reported in newspapers (this uniformity could also be considered a form of 
censorship). Gamble and Watanabe (2004) believe that there are four main factors that contribute 
to this issue in Japan: “1) the high concentration of power in Japanese media, 2) the marketing 
strategies of the major papers, 3) editorial tradition, and 4) the government’s enormous influence 
over the papers through a variety of institutions but particularly through the press club system” 
(p. 37).  
Culturally, according to Hofstede (1980; 1984; 1998; 2001), the Japanese are a 
collectivistic society; they show more uncertainty avoidance, and are a highly masculine society 
that is more long-term oriented. According to Hofstede’s scale (1980; 1984; 1998; 2001), Japan 
is the leading masculine country, which helps in understanding why there is less equality 
between men and women within the country, compared to men and women in the United States. 
This larger power distance, compared to the United States, can also help explain Japan’s aversion 
to situations lacking structure (uncertainty avoidance). The fact that the Japanese are an Asian 
society that is highly collectivistic (they don’t focus on the individual) helps to explain why they 
are more prone to being long-term oriented (demonstrating thrift and perseverance).  
  
More recent research (2000-2012) indicates that Japanese society may no longer be as 
Hofstede first found it in 1980. This newer research indicates that there have been many changes 
over the years (especially since the 1960s when the first round of surveys was conducted) within 
Japan. For example, in the late 1980s, and early 1990s, the economic “bubble” burst, leading to a 
recession that has affected almost every aspect of Japanese society (Roberson & Suzuki, 2003).  





Japanese are not as high in uncertainty avoidance as they once were (i.e., the changing family 
structure, the changing male/female dynamics, and the changing work/company structure). 
Starting with the family structure, Nathan (2002) describes traditions that have come and 
gone, for example, the intense focus on entrance exams to get into college for Japanese youth; 
these traditions are still there but there is a decline in those who choose to go to school and stay 
in school, which can be attributed to the intense stress that comes along with preparing to take 
the entrance exams. Also, there is the family structure, still somewhat focused on the ie, or “stem 
family” household where the father/husband goes to work, is gone all day and the mother/wife 
stays home all day, taking care of the children and any parents who may live in the residence, a 
tradition that is slowly going to the wayside. Hendry (2003) states: “Today the majority of 
Japanese families live in urban areas, and for most there is no longer a physical ie which has 
been passed down from generation to generation” (p. 34). The most common families for whom 
this family structure still flourishes are families with their own land. After the economic boom in 
the 1980s, the number of these families had lessened because many families sold their land for 
small fortunes and moved into the growing cities (Nathan, 2002; Hendry, 2003).  
However, Hendry (2003) found that it is still common for an elderly parent to go live 
with a son or daughter later, a part of the family structure of ie. The difference today, according 
to Hendry is that the adult children no longer stay at home to take care of their ageing parents; 
instead the parents are placed in adult day care, so the adult children can continue to work 
outside the house. 
Marriage rates have decreased, and the divorce rate has increased, as well as women 
choosing not to have children (Nathan, 2002; Schnell, 2005; Roberson & Suzuki, 2003), 





the decline in the birth rate is related to the bursting of the economic bubble in the late 1980s, 
early 1990s. Women want to avoid the economic hardships they endured growing up.  
Further, the idea that, overall, Japan is highly masculine may no longer be the case, as 
there is a growing feminist consciousness where women today tend to be less acquiescent about 
their husbands’ preoccupation with work.  The ie family structure and the “good wife/wise 
mother” model where the mother stays at home full time to take care of the children, often 
through high school, coddling them and making sure their focus and energy is on entrance exams 
is an idea that is becoming more and more rare every year (Nathan, 2002; Roberts, 2005).   
Another indication that Japanese society may be becoming more individualistic and less 
“long-term oriented,” as Hofstede had argued, may be found in its company practices. Where it 
once was common practice for men (known as “salary men”) to get a job and stay with that 
company for life, companies have been moving towards a more Western philosophy by hiring 
outside the company and giving promotions to employees based on performance and not 
seniority. Nathan (2002) describes career transition services or, in the simplest terms, 
unemployment agencies. Nathan found that these types of agencies are becoming more common 
in Japan with the rise of workers being laid off due to a shift towards more American and 
Western company practices, brought on by the bursting of the economic bubble in the late 1980s, 
early 1990s.  
Ronald and Alexy (2011) further argue that the gap formed by the erosion of regular or 
normal male employment has been filled with women moving into the realm of paid work. 
However, women’s standing in the workplace still remains inferior to their male counterparts, 
even with the improved educational conditions for women in Japan. Most women are only 





time male workers (Ronald & Alexy, 2011; Hidaka, 2011). Further, Hidaka (2011) stated that the 
percent of female full-time workers has dropped from 68.1% in 1985 (of the total female workers 
in non-agricultural jobs) to 46.6% in 2007 (Gender Equality Bureau, 2008). This decline is due 
to what Hidaka calls a deliberate strategy of many companies to employ female part-timers 
because it saves the company money as well as protect the ideal of the male ‘salary man,’ 
protecting the privileges of full-time male workers and supporting the gendered division of labor 
in the household.  
This division of labor is a common theme throughout Japan. An equal division of labor or 
lack thereof, is one reason cited by many females who are single as to why they aren’t marrying 
and having children (Nakano, 2011). Many women have said they want to get married, but they 
have not found the ideal partner. That ideal partner is one who is willing to do more than simply 
go to work and come home. Females are looking for a companion who is willing to help with 
household chores and child rearing (Nakano, 2011). In the past, Japanese families have arranged 
marriages for their loved ones; this is no longer common and even seen as a measure of 
desperation. The focus is now on marrying someone for love, and many women who were 
surveyed were content waiting for the man of their dreams, even if it meant they might never 
have children, or could remain single for the rest of their lives. The willingness to wait is one 
reason why the average age of marriage has risen and one reason that many are choosing not to 
have children (Nakano, 2011).  
This discussion of current Japanese cultural aspects is an indication that Hofstede may 
have over generalized and/or that his study is simply too dated to fit contemporary Japan.  






Japan’s Media Structure 
The structure of today’s Japanese news media can be traced back to the militaristic 
government of 1931-1945, which began with the China war, lasting through the end of World 
War II. During that time the leadership used the media as a thought control tool over the 
populace in an effort to focus all the nation’s resources on military goals, a movement known as 
the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement (Gamble & Watanabe, 2004). Bestor et al. (2011) 
stated: “The contemporary Japanese culture and society have been shaped in response to a 
number of radical shocks or historical disjuncture’s” (p. 2). For instance, after the war, the media 
chose to use different words in their broadcasts: instead of broadcasting “haisen” or Japan’s 
defeat, they chose to use the word “shusen,” the end of the war (Maeda, 2003) because they 
didn’t want the people of Japan to think less or negative thoughts about their country. 
During this time of war and shortly thereafter, government leaders instituted a form of 
drastic censorship, resource rationing as well as other policies that would later drive thousands of 
publishers out of business and would lead to a significantly consolidated media industry. These 
consolidations led to the emergence of five major dailies as well as local papers for the 51 
prefectures (Gamble & Watanabe, 2004). Currently, Japan still has the five major national 
newspapers all with affiliations with the five major television stations in Japan, all of which are 
publically owned.   
 
The Information Cartels  
Japan’s media has been given the nickname of information cartels. Freeman (2000) 
stated: “While the media have considerable potential power and a widely recognized influence 





and shape the ways their influence is utilized” (p. 13). From there Freeman outlined three 
institutions that make up the cartel process: the kisha clubs, the newspaper kyokai (industry 
association), and the media keiretsu (business groups). Each institution represents a level of 
analysis. The kisha clubs focus on the relationships that exist between official news sources and 
the reporters that cover them as well as the relationships that occur among journalists from 
competing firms. At the kyokai, or news industry level, relationships are organized at the 
industry level among news agencies themselves. The keiretsu, or business groups link print 
media with other sources of news available to the public, such as broadcast media. Each one of 
these institutions affects the content and flow of information in Japan. Refer to Figure 1 for an 
outline of the media structure and key connections within Japan’s media networks. The next 
sections will address these institutions and discuss how the information cartels of Japan have 






























(1) = Kisha Clubs 
(2) = Kyokai 
(3) = Keiretsu 
 
Figure 1.   
Key Connections within Japan’s Media Networks 
Source: Freeman, 2000. 
 
The (Kisha) Press Clubs of Japan   
Of the three levels of relationships in Japan’s media, many agree that the press clubs are 
the main problem within the media structure of Japan, often acting as a barrier to information 
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the media system is run similar to a monopoly or cartel by only allowing club members access to 
government information. O’Dwyer (2005) states that: 
The Foreign Press Centre of Japan (1997) identifies key problems with Japanese press 
clubs as: favoring the dominant and established media outlets, a monopoly on political 
news by press club members; a perilously close relationship between news sources and 
journalists; and an unequal relationship between journalists and government by virtue of 
the provision by the news source of accommodation and facilities for journalists. (p. 2) 
 
This club system is viewed as a corrupt and biased system because members essentially 
receive the same information via press releases, lectures, press conferences and the like, all of 
which is presented by the source in a calculated manner to make the source out in as flattering a 
way as possible (Gamble & Watanabe, 2004). Sources include the Prime Minister's official 
residence, government ministries, local authorities, the police, and corporate bodies.  
Kisha clubs often make “blackboard” agreements that are essentially agreements as to 
how the press will handle the stories; they are called such because they are communicated via a 
blackboard in a press room. These agreements are made to avoid excessive competition during 
reporting.  
Van Wolferen, a foreign news correspondent, stated in an interview with Gamble and 
Watanabe (2004) that “the variation of opinion among newspapers is smaller [in Japan] than 
anywhere in the world that I have seen. Only in countries where regimes have dictatorial power 
over the press can you find such unanimity” (p. 45). 
Problems like those stated above, didn’t happen overnight. The current system took time 
to become the problem it is today. 
Japan’s current media structure evolved over the course of many years, its rich history 
playing a large part in that evolution. Journalistic activity among the populace was forbidden in 





official proclamations, or one-way media that conveyed the will of those above to those below 
until around 1868 when the Meiji Restoration started. The Restoration period is credited with the 
birth and growth of the newspapers and magazines, however, the one-way communication style 
didn’t change. Taketoshi (1989) states:  
The new Meiji government actually promoted the birth and growth of newspapers, but 
certainly not as a medium to convey information upward. Rather it planned to make the 
newspapers as a medium with which to promote its prime agenda: Japan’s Civilization 
and Enlightenment. (bunmei kaika) (p. 375) 
 
In the 1870s the People’s Rights Movement was established and most newspapers of the 
time shifted to anti-government stances (Taketoshi, 1989). These anti-government stances of the 
newspapers lead to strained relationships with the government; the government felt threatened 
and only those papers that followed what the government wanted were treated well. For example, 
if the newspaper was one that was anti-government, those outlets received warmed-over news. 
The police had suppressed and banned those papers with an anti-government stance, but the 
people’s rights movement was so effective that even though the papers the people of Japan 
subscribed to were banned, they still sent in their subscription fees. However, the government 
saw that these newspapers were still going to report on the activities of the government and 
found that they could not turn these newspapers away just because they were from a people’s 
rights paper.  
Reporters would assemble at important government assemblies and wait for the 
information to be dispatched; it was here that the first form of press clubs were formed. The 
reporters were forced to wait in the waiting rooms of the governmental offices. By 1882, the 
People’s Rights Movement was successful in its quest for a constitution and the formation of a 





would be used as a waiting room for the press and all those who were entitled to receive public 
notifications and appointments. The following year, a similar waiting room was set up at the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Police Headquarters, and in 1884, an “official” in charge of issuing news 
manuscript was appointed. This man was to deal directly with the reporters, and the information 
given to him was what the government and police wanted the press to report. As more of these 
waiting rooms popped up around the country, a club-like atmosphere began to arise where men 
were able to gather and discuss information and opinions. Finally, in 1889, the Meiji 
Constitution was promulgated, and, in 1890, the National Diet took form and thus came a more 
liberal stance on newspapers (Taketoshi, 1989).  
From here on, it became clear just how indispensable the Diet sessions would be, the 
people wanted news from the Diet after it was formed so newspaper reporters descended on the 
scene in full force, prompting the Diet to issue tickets to the sessions. These tickets would lead to 
the actual formation of the press clubs, growing out of attempts to equitably distribute the limited 
number of tickets that were allotted. From 1890 to 1910, press clubs popped up in public offices, 
the Diet, and party headquarters. In 1908, Prime Minister Katsura Taro found that the best way 
to manipulate the press was through these clubs, and it was during his tenure that the clubs went 
from waiting rooms to their own comfortably furnished staffed quarters. “The switch from 
exclusion of patronage of the press clubs, then, was the clever stratagem of a prime minister who 
had become wise in the ways of controlling men’s minds” (Taketoshi, 1989, p. 382). Since then, 
the press clubs of Japan have dominated the way the media structure is run.  
By 1945 there was one club for almost every ministry, and, membership in these clubs 
was exclusive. Becoming a member of a press club meant registering with the government and 





War II, the United States oversaw the implementation of the current constitution in Japan that 
gives the press the freedom of speech and expression; however that did not change the press club 
system and the way news was and still is reported. Reporters still needed to be from powerful 
newspapers and you could not gather news unless you belonged to a press club. Today, there has 
been some change in these processes, including a change to the ruling party of Japan in 2009. 
The landslide loss of the LDP to the DPJ has seen recent changes in the way press clubs are 
operated, for example, some government officials have opened their press conferences to 
everyone regardless of press clubs and some officials have started using the Internet for press 
conferences and announcements. 
McCargo and Hyon-Suk (2010) also found that even though new media are being 
adopted in Japan, there is still the tendency to stick with the old, not only because there are laws 
and restrictions on using those modes of communication, but because many Japanese are content 
with broadcast news and print newspapers. Also, the new ruling party, the DPJ, came to power 
campaigning that it would make changes to the press club system, abolishing the clubs and 
opening press conferences to everyone who wanted to gather the news. However, their attempts 
to do so have had poor results. As of the time of the article’s publication (2010) only four major 
ministries had opened up their press conferences. The reason for this lack of headway on the 
abolition of the press clubs is that the major news media outlets do not cover the press club wars; 
all the news being reported by these newspapers is from press clubs who do not want to see them 
go away. 
A few Japanese journalists have spoken out against these clubs; Tatsuya Iwase 






Japanese press clubs are nothing more than transfer devices. They function and will 
continue to function as mouthpieces for those interests that hold power in this country, 
because all they [press club journalists] do is a rote transfer of the information they are 
provided by news sources. This is assured, because that is the way they are able to stay 
close to the powers they work with and from whom they are fed exclusive information. 
The newspapers, of course, find this to be a very low-cost option for filling their pages, 
and so from a market perspective, it’s hard for editors and managers to resist. (p. 33) 
 
More recently, in the aftermath of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, the kisha 
clubs have come under scrutiny. On April 25, 2011, a group of Japanese journalists launched a 
new organization called the Free Press Association of Japan (FPAJ) (Segawa, 2011). The 
organization was launched after many freelance journalists were not allowed access to 
information regarding the disaster, a practice that Segawa (2011) believed could have 
endangered the lives of many citizens.  
In a further look into the flow of information from the government to the media, 
Nakamura (2010) studied how the regime shift in 2009 has affected the flow of political 
information in Japan. Nakamura did this through a qualitative look at the Japanese press club 
literature and by investigating newspaper coverage since the DPJ took over in September 2009 as 
well as a series of interviews with different news services. When the DPJ took over, it had the 
goal of becoming more politically transparent, and it began by instituting some new media 
policies, including the announcement that news conferences would be held in principle only by 
politicians during legislative sessions and by opening up press conferences to include non-press 
club members. Nakamura (2010) found that this opening-up did in fact affect the flow of 
information; in the past it only came through the mainstream media but now it comes through in 
all news organizations including magazines and online media. It seems that the DPJ is aware of 
the growing and aging population and by moving to allow the freer flow of information from 
more than just the mainstream press has made an effort to attract the younger, more technically 





However, the opening up of press conferences has not signaled the end of the press clubs. 
The relationships between the reporters and the agencies, ministries, and businesses they report 
on are comfortable and many times can come with perks. These reporters are essentially 
embedded in these organizations. They are, or become over time, good friends with those whom 
they report on. Many instances have arisen in the past in Japan where the reporters knew what 
was going on, but they practiced self-censorship and did not publish the known information. For 
example, in 1988, the media did not report that the Showa Emperor had cancer, even though it 
seemed to be common knowledge (Seward, 2005). Also, for example, reporters were well aware 
of the background to the 1974 Tanaka scandal, the 1976 Lockheed scandal, the 1988 recruit 
scandal, as well as every other postwar political scandal; however, no newspaper dared to reveal 
the information. Newspapers revealed the scandals only after outsiders from publications like the 
Bungei Shunju, a monthly magazine, brought them to light (Nester, 1989).  These relationships 
are yet another way the media are controlled; essentially the reporters work for the organization 
in which they are embedded.  
These changes in the media and the government likely affected the coverage of the March 
2011 earthquake; however, studies have not yet been released regarding the media coverage of 
this disaster in Japan; if available, they would be valuable in plotting the future of these clubs 
and the Japanese media as a whole.  
 
The Newspaper Kyokai (The newspaper industry: The Nihon Shimbun Kyokai) 
For seven years after the war the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was 
the U.S. led occupying force. When SCAP took control, it chose not to dismantle the wartime 





SCAP wanted to use the easily manipulated media structure to influence Japanese public opinion 
to SCAP’s own ends. The problems with not reforming the media were ownership remained 
highly concentrated and censorship was rampant. Many of the traits and structure that make up 
the news media of Japan today can be traced to pre-wartime and wartime because of SCAP’s 
decision not to reform the media.  
In 1946 the NSK (The Nihon Shimbun Kyokai) was established. The NSK contributed to 
the democratization of the press in Japan, educating journalists on their obligations and 
responsibilities to society, publishing documents, and holding seminars about free speech. 
However, one of the greatest powers that the association took over was developing the rules and 
regulations for the distribution of scarce newsprint, which gave the association the power to limit 
entry into the newspaper market by new publications (Freeman, 2000). But perhaps even more 
importantly, the association was given the role of the definer, legitimator, adjudicator, and 
maintainer of the press club system, which in turn gave the association control of Japan’s 
information cartels. To understand better the relationships between this association and the 
newspapers, the following section discusses the “big 5” newspapers and their direct affiliates.  
 
The “Big 5” 
Today, Japan is a world leader in newspaper circulation with five national daily 
newspapers. As of 2010, Japan ranked third in the world for paid-for dailies total average 
circulation with 50,353,000 subscribers (World Press Trends, 2010). However, many believe this 
number is inflated because each of Japan’s national daily newspapers publishes a morning and an 
evening edition, whereas many nations no longer find it profitable to do so. Also, Japanese 





short-term profits, the newspapers are known to fight for market share, focusing on subscribers, 
striving to be the newspaper with the most. Almost all of Japan’s newspapers (all except the 
entertainment tabloids) have home delivery, and newspaper-sales campaigns are broadly targeted 
to all demographics and promoted through intense door-to-door subscription drives (Gamble & 
Watanabe, 2004). In order to gain subscribers, each national paper tries to offer articles on as 
many different topics as possible with the editorial policy that avoids offending any demographic 
group resulting in overemphasized facts, little opinion, and, in many cases, a boring take on the 
news.  
Japan’s main publications include the Yomiuri, with a circulation of 10,019,000 (World 
Press Trends, 2010), the Asahi, with a circulation of 8,019,000 (World Press Trends, 2010), the 
Mainichi, with a circulation of 3,738,000 (World Press Trends, 2010), the Sankei with a 
circulation of 2,160,000 (Foreign Press Center of Japan, 2010) , and the Nihon Keizai with a 
circulation of 4,630,000 (Foreign Press Center of Japan, 2010). Each of these five dailies also 
has affiliations with one of the nation’s five national television stations. The Yomiuri is 
associated with Nippon TV, the Asahi with TV Asahi, the Mainichi with TBS (Tokyo 
Broadcasting Systems), Nihon Keizai with TV Tokyo, and the Sankei has associations with Fuji 
TV. All associations are subject to legal constraints to avoid excessive power concentrations; 
however, these newspapers and broadcasters still have a significant amount of influence over one 
another and with some recent loosening of rules, newspapers are now allowed to own a higher 
percentage of television stations, a sign that things are going towards a similar structure of the 
West with its paradigm of multi-outlet ownership (Gamble & Watanabe, 2004). Gamble and 





Bagdikian’s (1983) concerns over the dangers of such a consolidated industry on democracy 
stating:  
If even a portion of Bagdikian’s assertions are true—that the depth and breadth of 
discourse is constrained by high concentrations of media power and that such media 
industries are easily manipulated by power holders—this is even more the case in Japan, 
where the press media has suffered from such high ownership concentration for some 
seventy years. (Gamble & Watanabe, 2004, p. 41) 
 
This high concentration in media ownership is a key factor in how and why the media 
structure is the way it is and why it isn’t changing anytime soon. Another key factor in the highly 
homogenous media is that of the kisha or press clubs.  
 
The Media Keiretsu (Business Groups) of Japan 
This institution involves the ownership of the media and the relationships between the 
companies that own the outlets. Freeman (2000) described Japan’s newspaper ownership as 
appearing to be joint-stock companies, whereas they are closer to employee-controlled 
organizations.  The Japanese Commercial Code allows newspaper companies to impose 
restrictions on the sale or transfer of their shares. Most newspaper companies are not even listed 
on the stock exchange, and their shares are controlled by associations managed for the benefit of 
the workers with some residual shares being held by the founding families. This ownership 
exemption was passed in 1951 so these newspaper companies could have freedom from external 
control, but it also ended up being a protection from being taken over by a foreign firm. As the 
media have expanded ownership shares to include radio and television, this exemption has in 
turn protected the entire media industry from outside influence. 
The keiretsu relations are the relationships or affiliations between the broadcasting 





at least 1924, and from then on, newspapers have had the most control, owning as much as they 
can of the broadcast stations as well as the local papers, as most local papers actually belong to 
or are affiliated with a national broadcasting group. Freeman (2000) states:  
In most cases the parent newspaper owns shares in the station and in some cases so too 
does the newspaper’s metropolitan broadcasting affiliate. Personnel and other capital 
connections from the national newspaper and the metropolitan broadcaster, as well as the 
local station’s dependence on the nationals for news and programming, further 
consolidate their clear identity as a member of the group. (p. 155) 
 
These relationships are what have extended the control of the newspapers to broadcasting 
and other outlets in Japan and have preempted the rise of alternative media. These relationships 
also ensure that the newspapers will continue to be Japan’s main source of news information. 
This arrangement is unlike what has occurred in the United States. Carey and Maynard (2005) 
discussed briefly that newspapers in the U.S. have been barred from owning television stations in 
their markets since at least the 1970s. This was because it is believed that these collaborations 
limit the variety and diversity in the news. Japan has a definite lack of diversity in its news, and 
this result is partly due to this collaboration between the newspapers and the broadcast stations 















The following overarching research question guided my study: Does culture affect the 
framing of disaster news stories? A review of the literature about media coverage of disasters, 
framing, and the influence of culture on news supports the following hypotheses. 
 
The Effect of Culture on Disaster Coverage 
Understanding the cultural differences between the two countries being studied can help 
to explain how and why their news coverage of the March 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami 
may differ. Using the five cultural dimensions put forth by Hofstede (1984; 2001) we know that 
Americans have a smaller power distance, are more uncertainty-accepting, are highly 
individualistic, and are more minimal-social-differentiated with a short-term orientation. On the 
other hand, the Japanese have a larger power distance, show more uncertainty avoidance, are a 
collectivistic society, are highly masculine, and are known to have a higher long-term 
orientation. From these cultural differences it can be assumed that the Japanese newspaper will 
use fewer myths than the American newspaper.  
 The Japanese have a stronger Uncertainty Avoidance (46, ranking 7
th
), meaning they are 
a more structured or rigid society with the employment of more safety and security measures. 
Because the Japanese are this way, it is less likely that references to panic flight, psychological 
dependency, and disaster shock would be reported; Japanese reporters would know the safety 
precautions in place and that people would be less likely to panic because they know that the 
building codes are strict, emergency regulations are in place, and that help would be on the way. 





shock, and psychological dependency would not occur because of the amount of importance the 
Japanese place on taking care of each other.  
Also, in the United States, panic flight, psychological dependency and disaster shock are 
commonly reported in news media and seen in movies (Fischer, 1994; Quarantelli, 1985), 
making it much more likely that they would be reported in the United States. Therefore the 
following hypotheses were posed about the coverage of the March 2011 Japan earthquake: 
 H1A1: The NYTimes.com will use the panic flight myth more than will the Yomiuri 
Shimbun online coverage.  
 H1A2: The NYTimes.com will use the psychological dependency myth more than 
will the Yomiuri Shimbun online coverage. 
 H1A3: The NYTimes.com will use the disaster shock myth more than will the 
Yomiuri Shimbun online coverage. 
 
Japanese society displays a long-term orientation (scoring 80 on the scale), wherein 
persistence, thrift, and having a sense of shame and family hierarchy, as well as believing in 
treating others as they would want to be treated are important. These ideas are held strongly in 
Japan, lessening the likelihood of looting. Japanese people are a patient people, unlike people 
from the United States who want things when they want them (the United States scored a 29 on 
the scale). Therefore the following hypothesis was posed about the coverage of the March 2011 
Japan earthquake: 
 H1A4: The NYTimes.com will use the looting myth more than will the Yomiuri 






Long-term orientation can also be why the myth of evacuation behavior is not reported in 
the Japanese newspaper. The Japanese are known as patient people who obey the golden rule. 
Consequently, evacuating with no respect for other individuals would be unlikely.  Japan’s 
strong uncertainty avoidance would also explain why evacuation behavior would not happen nor 
be reported. Japan is a society that likes structure, with rules and regulations such as strict 
building codes because of past disaster experience; because of Japan’s strict structure, it would 
be more likely to see this myth reported in the United States coverage than in the Japanese 
coverage. Therefore the following hypothesis was posed about the coverage of the March 2011 
Japan earthquake: 
 H1A5: The NYTimes.com will use the evacuation behavior myth more than will the 
Yomiuri Shimbun online coverage.  
 
Timing, a part of long-term/short-term orientation, is a factor in reporting disaster myths. 
Reporters are on a deadline; however, the American people are demanding information about the 
disaster, they are farther away, making it harder to get information sometimes, so U.S. reporters 
may be more likely to make assumptions about the behaviors they see instead of taking time to 
fully investigate them. The number of myths should be higher in the U.S. coverage because the 
reporters are making assumptions about disaster behavior and the haste with which reporters are 
forced to report their stories.  
It is also possible that time and culture may interact to explain the use of disaster myths 
in the two newspapers. Because the two countries vary greatly in the long-term/short-term 
orientation, (The U.S. wants immediate reaction and answers, whereas the Japanese are more 





disaster struck coupled with this fact could interact to explain the use or non-use of disaster 
myths.  Thus, the following predictions were made:  
 H2A: The NYTimes.com will use more myths during the first 5 days of coverage of 
the March 2011 Japan earthquake than it will during the next 30 days of coverage. 
 H2B: Across the two online newspapers, time and culture will interact to predict the 
number of disaster myths in the coverage of the March 2011 Japan earthquake. 
 
 
Disasters are not everyday occurrences; people often do not have experiences that will help 
them understand the impact and damage of the disaster. One approach reporters could take to 
convey to readers the circumstances surrounding the disaster would be to refer to past disasters 
for comparisons. In the case of the NYTimes.com, having something to compare the Japan 
earthquake to may be particularly important because its readers are not in Japan to see the 
destruction firsthand. So NYTimes.com reporters may be more inclined to use references to past 
disasters to help their readers understand what has happened. Thus, the following predictions 
was made:  
 H3A: Past disasters will be mentioned more in the NYTimes.com than in The Yomiuri 
Shimbun online coverage. 
 
The Effect of Gatekeeping on Disaster Coverage 
Gatekeeping is defined by Shoemaker (1996) as the “process by which countless 
messages are reduced to the few we are offered in our daily newspapers and television news 





involved in the reporting process. Gatekeeping asks what will the stories be written about? What 
should be included or left out? And how should the story be shaped? Scanlon, Luukko, and 
Morten (1978) found, in times of disaster, the gatekeeping process is lacking because the demand 
for information is high and access to accurate information, such as death and injury tolls, and 
damage estimates, may be limited, leading to conflicting information being published. This is to 
be expected in U.S. coverage of the March 2011 earthquake because access was limited; 
reporters were not in Japan when the disaster struck, so they were unable to see the areas hit or to 
get immediate access to those with information regarding the death toll, injuries, and damage in 
the initial hours after the disaster struck. Since the earthquake took place in Japan, Japanese 
journalists had a better opportunity to reach sources who had more accurate death toll, injury, 
and damage estimates. Thus, the following hypothesis was posed: 
 H4A: The number of stories with conflicting information (i.e., death, injury, missing, and 
damage estimates) about the March 2011 earthquake will be greater in the NYtimes.com 
than in the Yomiuri Shimbun online coverage.  
 
Sourcing can also prove to be an issue in stories published in the aftermath of disasters. For 
example, Quarantelli (1981) found that most stories included “official” sources, which provide 
what he calls the “command-post point of view” of disasters. Official sources are those that are 
elected or appointed; for example, the director of FEMA, or a state government official are 
official sources. This command-post point of view can present a skewed view of events. 
Considering Japan’s heavy reliance on the press club system, the sources used by Japanese 
reporters are expected to be higher because most reporters are receiving the same press releases 





and government ministries are putting out. Reporters who do not belong to the press clubs, such 
as foreign reporters, will have less access to the types and number of sources than those who do 
belong to the press club. Also, since Japan was the country where the disaster took place, it is 
expected that Japanese reporters will have more access to a larger variety of sources than will the 
journalists from the United States. Thus, I made the following predictions: 
 H5A: The Yomiuri Shimbun will use more sources in its earthquake coverage than will 
the NYTimes.com coverage. 
 H5B: The Yomiuri Shimbun online coverage will use more “official” sources than will 
the NYTimes.com coverage.  
 H5C: Across both papers, there will be more use of “official” sources than non-official 
sources. 
 
Media Hype and Disaster Coverage 
Disasters can be the trigger for a media hype (Vasterman, 2005; Vasterman, Yzermans  & 
Dirkzwager, 2005; Wien & Elemelund-Praestekaer, 2009). Trigger events are unusual events that 
the news media will focus upon and enlarge with their non-stop coverage, evoking social 
responses that will eventually become news as well, thus further stimulating the news wave 
(Vasterman, 2005). The initial earthquake and tsunami were immediate disasters, something 
Japan is familiar with. The nuclear crisis took longer to unfold and has been laden with 
uncertainty about the outcome, making it more unusual than the earthquake and tsunami 
disasters. The debate over the safety of nuclear energy is world-wide and Japan is a country that 
depends heavily on nuclear power, making the nuclear issue more unusual than the other two 





on the nuclear crisis because of the uncertainty of its outcome and the potential for the nuclear 
damage to last for years. There is also the fact that there are many possible health risks and other 
factors that make nuclear energy dangerous; therefore it may be that journalists focused a great 
deal of their energy on the nuclear crisis. Thus, I asked the following question:  
 Research Question 1: For both the New York Times and the Yomiuri Shimbun, is 
























This study employed a content analysis, defined as “the systematic, objective, 
quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (Neundorf, 2002, p. 1). Content analyses have 
been used to study the content of many types of media messages, including the analysis to 
newspaper coverage of disasters (i.e., Quarantelli et al., 1993; Tierneyet al., 2006; Goltz, 1984).  
I performed a content analysis of online newspaper stories posted in two newspapers 
between March 11and April 15, 2011, that mentioned the March 2011 Japan earthquake, 
tsunami, or nuclear crisis. The reason for this time frame was twofold. First, in this study, two of 
the concepts I measured were media hype and disaster myths. In order to find the height of the 
nuclear crisis coverage it was important to start from the beginning of the coverage of the 
disaster, which was March 11, 2011. If I started 15 days out and sampled 35 days from there, I 
might have missed when the hype started.  
As for disaster myths, they too have typically appeared in the hours and days after a 
disaster has struck and lessen over time (Quarantelli, 1985; Solnit, 2009). As a result, I needed to 
gather stories from the beginning of the disaster coverage. The second reason for this 36-day 
time frame is that I wanted to investigate changes in the use of sources in the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster.   
 
Newspaper Outlet Selection 
 I analyzed the online editions of two national newspapers, The New York Times and The 
Yomiuri Shimbun. I selected The New York Times online version, NYTimes.com, because, 





newspaper websites in the United States. The New York Times online audience as of March 2010 
was 15,445,000 unique visitors per month, five million more than The Washington Post’s 
monthly visitors of 10,062,000.  The NYTimes.com not only publishes a significant number of 
stories from its print version but also adds many features like slide shows, charts, and videos. 
The New York Times is a prestigious and influential newspaper in the United States winning 106 
Pulitzer Prize awards since it first began in 1851 (The New York Times Company). Further, 
Danielian and Reese’s 1996 study of intermedia agenda setting found that the New York Times 
set the agenda for other news media outlets on the issue of the nation’s cocaine problem in the 
late 1980s.  
The second source I used was the Yomiuri Shimbun’s online newspaper website. 
According to World Press Trends 2010, the Yomiuri Shimbun leads Japan in circulation and the 
Yomiuri Shimbun online ranks number one in Japan with roughly 13,000,000 unique visitors per 
month. The Yomiuri Shimbun’s online site was launched in 1995, and it offers a wide array of 
news, photos, and videos. The Yomiuri online offers a website in Japanese and one in English; 
the site that I used was the English language website. With the help of a Japanese translator to 
navigate the website and gain membership, I was able to collect my sample. 
 My universe of content was articles from the NYTimes.com and the Yomiuri Shimbun 
website (yomiuri.co.jp). I investigated the time frame of March 11 to April 15, 2011. I took a 
census sample of all articles relating to the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis 
from both the NYTimes.com and yomiuri.co.jp.  
For the search on the NYTimes.com, many search terms were examined to find the most 
comprehensive list of articles. The most comprehensive term was “Japan earthquake” which 





the most exhaustive list was “East Japan major earthquake disaster.” The reason for having 
different search terms between the two newspapers was the language difference. Ken Beecken, a 
Japanese translator, explained that in Japan people use a different word for “earthquake” which 
translates to "earthquake disaster" – “this term is more commonly used when an earthquake 
actually hits populated areas, i.e., an earthquake in the middle of the ocean is just an earthquake, 
whereas an earthquake that hits a populated area and causes damages is an ‘earthquake disaster’” 
(K. Beecken, personal communication, October 13, 2011). The search from the Yomiuri Shimbun 
yielded 595 articles.  
For each newspaper, after a search was run on the website’s archives, all editorials, letters 
to the editor, and blogs were removed from the sample, leaving only the news and feature stories. 
Furthermore, because some items about the March 11 earthquake that ran in the Yomiuri 
Shimbun online were very short (e.g., there were articles that were nothing but a list of the dead 
and missing, there were also articles that were nothing more than saying that a shelter is located 
in a specific spot, or were short re-caps of sports games); I required that news articles from this 
paper had to be at least three paragraphs long.  Intercoder reliability for the removal of 
newspaper items was a Cohen’s Kappa of .86. .  The final sample was as follows:  261 articles 
from NYTimes.com and 276 from the Yomiuri Shimbun online.  
  
Variables 
 In this study I measured 11 variables within each newspaper article: date of publication; 
newspaper outlet; author/byline; sources used in news stories; estimates of death, injury, missing 
and damage; references to past disasters; disaster myths; and media hype. See the appendix for a 





Date of Publication 
 Date of publication is the date that the story appears in the online newspaper.  To test 
some of my hypotheses, this variable was further broken into two categories:  early coverage 
(stories published between March 11 and March 15) and later coverage (stories published 
between March 16 and April 15).   
 
Newspaper Outlet 
 Each story was coded into one of two newspaper outlet categories, based on where it was 
published.   
 
Author/Byline    
 I wanted to measure how many stories were wire stories and how many stories originated 
with the chosen newspaper’s reporters. As part of my descriptive analysis of the coverage, I 
wanted to describe the newspaper’s reliance on wire services and other outside sources for 
stories. 
 
Sources used in News Stories  
I categorized the sources that reporters used in their stories. I also counted the total 
number of sources used in each story. A source was defined as a person, or entity (e.g., a 
company or an organization) that provided information and opinions that were attributed to that 
entity and that were directly quoted in the story.  
For this study, sources were broken into seven categories, some of which were adopted 





relevance to Japan. The source categories were: official, nongovernmental organizations, other 
media sources, victim sources, education/research/expert sources, business sources, and other.   
Official sources were defined as those who are elected or appointed to their positions. 
They included all government sources. Government were defined as sources that were at the 
federal level in the United States or unitary level in Japan, as well as state and local levels for 
both countries. The federal level includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
in the United States and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication’s Fire and Disaster 
Management Agency (FDMA) in Japan. The state, regional or prefectural level included state 
leaders in the United States such as governors; in Japan this would be the governor of a 
prefecture. The local level of government was also included here; this included fire, police, and 
all city employees, including mayors. 
 Official sources also included city police and fire department officials, and emergency 
management government agencies such as FEMA, and FDMA in Japan. An official source could 
also be Japan’s Self-Defense Force, or any source that states it is affiliated with the government.  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were any nonprofit, voluntary citizen group, 
organized on a local, national, or international level and included organizations like Save the 
Children. If it was not clear whether a source was an NGO, coders consulted Worldwide NGO 
Directory online as well as simply Googling organizations to determine whether the 
organizations in both Japan and the U.S. were an NGO or a government source. 
Other media sources included local, national, and international journalists, newspapers, 
television news broadcasts. Sometimes journalists used other journalists as sources, for example, 
“CNN reported that the U.S. has donated millions of dollars to the relief effort in Haiti,” or 





Victim sources were those people identified as a survivor or victim of the 
earthquake/tsunami and nuclear disaster.  
Educational/research/expert sources include educational sources such as professors who 
studied earthquakes or the Japan culture. They could also be members of agencies not associated 
with the government and that are not NGOs; an example of one such source would be the 
National Press Photographers Association. Associations and clubs fell under this category 
because reporters used the associations as experts or educational sources. Expert sources could 
be anyone from the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) or anyone who may be an expert in 
anything earthquake, tsunami, or nuclear related; for example, a source that might be used is an 
engineer of earthquake and tsunami warning systems, or a scientist at the earthquake research 
institute in Japan. Another example of an educational/research/expert source is a professor of 
sociology or professor of geology at a university. 
A business (spokesperson) source included any public information officer (PIO), public 
relations representative, director of communications or any person acting as a spokesperson for 
an organization. For example, any company affected by the disaster might have had its 
spokesperson speak with the media. A place this might have been seen was in coverage about the 
automotive industry. Another example would be as follows “Karen Cisco, spokesperson for 
Three Mile Island said…”  
If it could not be determined what category the source fell into, coders used the “other” 
source category. These “other” sources included unnamed passersby, sources with only first 
names, and sources who wished to remain anonymous and were given no other attribution.   
Other types of sources that may be listed under “other” are medical sources. Medical 





These members and the hospital do not speak on behalf of organizations like the Center for 
Disease Control or other large organizations affiliated with the government or NGOs. For 
example, if it said “Duane Lee, a doctor with the Iwate hospital, said, we have run out of medical 
supplies and have no power,” that would be counted as “other.” 
 
Estimates of Death, Injury, Missing, and Damages 
Mentions of the number of deaths from the disaster, the number of injured and the 
amount of damage were noted.  These estimates were reported as numbers. Examples include the 
following:  “At least 50 people have been killed, with that number expected to grow to more than 
200.” “The tsunami wiped out 90% of the town, killing approximately 30,000 people.” For 
example, journalists may report that damages are expected to surpass the billion dollar mark, or, 
damages are estimated at $5 million.   
 
Mentions of Past Disasters 
For each story I noted whether the story mentioned the following disasters: Chernobyl, 
Three-Mile Island, the Japanese tsunami of 1896, the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the 1960 
Chile earthquake, the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake, and the Kobe earthquake of 1995.  
 
Disaster Myths 
This study also investigated the use of five disaster myths: panic flight, looting, 
psychological dependency, disaster shock, and evacuation behavior. I measured the variety of 
myths that the newspapers used as well as the number of myths reported in the aftermath of the 





Disaster myths are based on the assumed behaviors humans display after catastrophic 
events. Disaster myths as stated by Quarantelli and Dynes (1972), are the popular images of how 
people behave in disasters and are based on flawed assumptions about the frailty of the human 
personality and social organization that are usually inaccurate or false.  
Panic flight, the first myth, deals with the individual; it is the idea that when a disaster 
occurs victims will panic and engage in any behavior they deem necessary to escape (Fischer, 
1994; Quarantelliet al., 1993, Quarantelli & Dynes, 1972). Operationally, panic flight was 
present in a story when journalists report that individuals panicked and ran to escape the danger 
from the earthquake and the tsunami. Examples of words that might be used in these references 
were these: “people scrambled to get away,” “people were running everywhere as if they didn’t 
know where to go,” and “they had a look of panic on their face as they ran away from the 
building.”     
 The term “looting” has military roots and implies that the invading army will take 
property by force, generally when the owner cannot protect it (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1972). 
Looting may be reported as people taking items that are not necessary for immediate survival 
and are instead used for personal gain, monetary or otherwise. Here is an example from The New 
York Times after Hurricane Katrina hit: “Chaos gripped New Orleans on Wednesday as looters 
ran wild….looters brazenly ripped open gates and ransacked stores for food, clothing, television 
sets, computers, jewelry and guns” (McFadden & Blumenthal, 2005). The New Orleans Times-
Picayune reported, “In the midst of the rising water, two men ‘were planning to head out to the 
levee to retrieve a stash of beer, champagne, and hard liquor they found washed out onto the 





 Psychological dependency, the third myth, was defined as victims and survivors being 
unable to function and take care of themselves after the disaster struck (Fisher, 1994).  In the 
news articles, psychological dependency could have been reported as outsiders being called into 
help with the recovery and response because victims and survivors were “out of it” and unable to 
take care of those hurt, those who need rescuing, the setting up of shelters, and the gathering of 
food, water and necessary supplies.  
 Disaster shock, the fourth myth, is the stunned, incredulous reaction immediately after a 
disaster (Fisher, 1994). In stories, examples of disaster shock were reports of people wandering 
about as if lost, sitting alone staring into space, walking as if they had no purpose, or even 
looking as if they were in a zombie-like state.   
Evacuation behavior, the fifth myth, refers to the group level of panic. This myth focuses 
on the behaviors that groups of people display when they are fleeing or evacuating. In this case, 
the myth says that if there is an evacuation, residents will flee in an unorganized and hysterical 
way, pushing and shoving each other, driving each other off roads to escape the imminent danger 
of a disaster (Fisher, 1994). This myth could be reported in stories as highways being riddled 
with accidents, and people driving erratically at high speeds to save themselves from the 
potential hazards with no regard for those around them.  
 
Media Hype 
 For this study, a media hype was conceptually defined as “a media generated, wall-to-
wall news wave, triggered by one specific event and enlarged by the self-reinforcing process 





hype was the number of news stories per day about the earthquake/tsunami of March 2011 or the 
resulting nuclear crisis.  
Stories were coded into one of three categories: 1) the March 2011 earthquake/tsunami 
was central to the story and/or the central theme of the story was about earthquakes/tsunamis in 
general, and the story contained a reference to the March 2011 earthquake/tsunami, 2) the story 
was primarily about the nuclear crisis brought on by the tsunami and earthquake, or about 
nuclear power in general, with some sort of reference to the Japan nuclear crisis; 3) the March 
2011 earthquake, tsunami, and the nuclear crisis were all central to the story. All aspects were 
treated with equal importance in the story. In order to accurately categorize each story, paragraph 
themes within each story were counted to see the predominant theme of each story.  
 
Coding Scheme Development 
 To develop my coding scheme, I examined variables used in past studies of disaster 
coverage. More specifically, I drew upon a large study done by Quarantelli et al.,(1993). This 
was a cross-cultural study that investigated the reporting of news in disasters by comparing 
Japanese and American communities. I based my source categories on this study. Quarentelli et 
al., also investigated various disaster myths. They looked at seven myths found in the literature: 
panic, looting, martial law, mass evacuation, increased crime, disaster shock, and mass 
sheltering. From this list I took panic (flight), looting, mass evacuation (evacuation behavior), 
and disaster shock. The fifth one that I added was psychological dependency and that was based 
on research done by Fisher (1994).  
 After a thorough investigation of the literature, the idea of gatekeeping, or lack thereof, 





Fisher (1994) mentioned gatekeeping briefly and it seemed as if investigating the fluctuation of 
estimates for those four estimation categories would be a worthwhile endeavor. To my 
knowledge, this has not been measured and was included in this study in an effort to see how 
often reporters rely on these past disaster experiences to relay the seriousness and scope of the 
current disaster to readers.  
 Media hype is a rather new phenomenon with only a few studies having been previously 
done. To code for a potential media hype I drew from Vasterman (2005) and Vasterman et al., 
(2005)’s work on media hypes.  
 
Coder Training 
 At the beginning of coder training, I went through the scheme completely with my other 
coder to address any questions she had. Then, the other coder and I practiced coding 15 online 
newspaper stories from each of the LA Times and the Japan Times, about the March 2011 
earthquake/tsunami and nuclear crisis. We then discussed our codes for each story, i.e., why each 
of us coded certain sources as we did and how we came to those conclusions. After this activity, 
I revised a few sections of the scheme to better reflect what was discussed, and we coded 15 
more practice stories from the same newspapers and discussed the codes again. We repeated this 
procedure three times until our practice runs resulted in a high level of coding agreement. We 
then moved onto intercoder reliability. 
 
Intercoder Reliability 
 In a quantitative content analysis, the reliability of the coding scheme must be established 





code 40% of the stories in the sample, i.e., 20% of the articles from the NYTimes.com and 20% 
from the sample of The Yomiuri Shimbun. This amounted to 31 stories from each newspaper (62 
total for the whole sample) for each intercoder reliability attempt. In all, four rounds of 
intercoder reliability were performed; each time a different set of stories was randomly selected 
using a systematic random sampling method.  
I calculated Cohen’s Kappa, a chance-adjusted reliability statistics to test the categorical 
variables for intercoder reliability.  My goal was to achieve intercoder reliability levels of .80 
and above. Neundorf (2002) states “reliability coefficients of .90 or greater would be acceptable 
to all, .80 or greater would be acceptable in most situations” (p. 143). However, Hayes (2005) 
suggests that levels of acceptability can be as low as .70. Krippendorff (2004) suggests an even 
lower level of acceptability of .667 when research is more exploratory in nature. Table 1 



























Table 1      
Variable Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
Classification of 
sources 
.71 .77 .64 .86 
Date .97 1.0 .96  
Author .69 .88 .97  
Area of Estimate .50 .49 .74  
Chernobyl .85 1.0 1.0  
Three Mile .85 1.0 1.0  
Bhopal No Mentions No Mentions 
(removed and 
added 1896 
tsunami in its 
place) 
N/A REMOVED 
1896 Tsunami N/A N/A 1.0  
Indian Ocean 
Tsunami of 2004 
.70 .00 No Mentions  
1960 Chile 
Quake 
No Mentions 1.0 1.0  
Great Kanto 
Quake 
1.0 No Mentions No Mentions 1.0 
Kobe 1995 
Quake 
.94 .85 1.0  
Panic Flight .00 1.0   
Looting No Mentions No Mentions .00 .64 
Disaster Shock .49 .00 .49 REMOVED 
Psych Dep No Mentions No Mentions No Mentions REMOVED 
Evac Behavior .00 .00 No Mentions REMOVED 
Media Hype .59 .50 .59 .86 
Intercoder Reliability Data 
As shown in Table 1, three variables were removed from the study because intercoder 
reliability could not be attained for them. Eleven variables had reliabilities of .86 or above, 
falling well within the intercoder reliability guidelines of Neundorf (2002), two variables had 
reliabilities between .70 and .74, falling within the guidelines set out by Hayes (2005), and one 
variable, looting, was just under Krippendorff’s (2004) guildelines . However, it was determined 
that this was acceptable due to the low number of looting mentions in the sample, the latent 





 Throughout all four intercoder reliability rounds it was found that there were a few 
variables that were rarely, if ever, mentioned, resulting in their removal. In the case of the 
Bhopal disaster, it was never mentioned, but I noticed that the 1896 tsunami in Japan was, so I 
made a replacement.  
As for the disaster myths, disaster shock, psychological dependency, and evacuation 
behavior were removed from the coding scheme due to the difficulty crafting effective 























This was a study of online newspaper articles from two newspapers: The New York Times 
and the Yomiuri Shimbun. The sample size was 537 articles, 261 from the New York Times and 
276 were from the Yomiuri Shimbun. Of the 261 newspaper articles from the New York Times, 
123 were staff written and 132 were written in collaboration or with contributions. Within the 
Yomiuri Shimbun, one was staff written and 267 had no mention of who wrote the stories. On 
average, a story used 3.87 sources to report information regarding the disaster. The 
NYTimes.com used an average of 4.57 sources per story and the Yomiuri Shimbun used an 
average of 3.20 sources per story. Stories were more likely to be about the March 2011 
earthquake/tsunami or earthquakes/tsunamis in general (41.7%) than they were to be about the 
2011 Japanese nuclear disaster or nuclear disasters/power in general (39.1%) or about 
earthquake/tsunamis and nuclear topics (19.2%) equally.  
 
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Disaster Myths 
General Information 
 Throughout the entire sample, disaster myths were only mentioned 19 times (3.5% of 
stories). Panic flight was mentioned 14 times (2.6%) and looting was mentioned five times (0.9% 







H1A1: The NYTimes.com will use the panic flight myth more than will the Yomiuri Shimbun 
online coverage. 
The newspapers used this myth sparingly; the NYTimes.com used it 12 times, and the 
Yomiuri Shimbun used it two times. To test H1A1, a chi-square test was used.  
This hypothesis was supported; there were significantly more uses of the panic flight 
myth within the New York Times (4.6%) than the Yomiuri Shimbun (.7%),  2(1, N = 537) = 7.93, 
p ≤ .05.  The effect size was .121 and was calculated using Cramer’s V. 
 
H1A2, H1A3, H1A5: The NYTimes.com will use the disaster shock, psychological dependency, 
and evacuation behavior myths more than will the Yomiuri Shimbun online coverage.  
 These three hypotheses were not tested due to the inability to reach intercoder reliability 
for the three disaster myths. These myths were either not mentioned at all, or the definitions were 
hard to agree on.  
 
H1A4: The NYTimes.com will use the looting myth more than will the Yomiuri Shimbun online 
coverage. 
 The looting myth was used even more sparingly that was the panic flight myth; the 
NYTimes.com mentioned this myth three times (1.1% of stories) and the Yomiuri Shimbun 
mentioned looting two times (0.7% of stories). To test this hypothesis, a chi-square test was 
used. 






H2A: The NYTimes.com will use more myths during the first 5 days of coverage of the March 
2011 Japan earthquake than it will during the next 30 days of coverage. 
To test this hypothesis, a Mann-Whitney U test was conducted because the dependent 
variable (number of myths per story) was not normally distributed (skewness was 5.04 and 
kurtosis was 23.53).  The Mann-Whitney U test is the nonparmetric equivalent of the t-test. 
Additionally, because Hypotheses H2A and H2B have overlapping data, a Bonferroni correction 
was made to the p value, to avoid inflating the family-wise Type I error rate. As a result, the p 
value for H2A and H2B is p≤.025. 
To test this hypothesis, a new variable had to be made: date groups. Based on the date, an 
article either went in group 1 (first 5 days) or group 2 (last 30 days). Across the sample there 
were 64 articles (24.5%) published in group 1 and 197 (75.5%) that were published in group 2.  
This hypothesis was not supported: z = -.199, p = .843.   
 
H2B: Across the two online newspapers, time and culture will interact to predict the number of 
disaster myths in the coverage of the March 2011 Japan earthquake. 
 To test this hypothesis, a new variable was created: total number of myths used per story. 
For the entire sample of 537 articles, disaster myths were only mentioned 19 times (3.5%).  
This hypothesis was tested by running a univariate analysis of variance, or ANOVA. This 
hypothesis was not supported: F (1, 32) = .74, p = .85. Time and culture did not interact to 










Nearly 70% of the time, no past disasters were mentioned in the articles and 22.5 % of 
the time at least one past disaster was mentioned. 
The NYTimes.com used an average of .51 past disasters per story, whereas the Yomiuri 
Shimbun used an average of .26 past disasters in each story. Overall, Chernobyl was the most 
frequently mentioned past disaster (13.2% of stories mentioned Chernobyl) and the 1995 Kobe 
earthquake was the second most mentioned past disaster (12.1% of stories mentioned Kobe). On 
average, the NYTimes.com mentioned Chernobyl .25 times and the Yomiuri Shimbun mentioned 
it .025 times. The 1995 Kobe earthquake was mention an average of .08 times in the 
NYTimes.com coverage and .16 times in the Yomiuri Shimbun.  
 
H3A: Past disasters will be mentioned more in the NYTimes.com than in the Yomiuri Shimbun 
online coverage.  
 To test this hypothesis, the number of past disasters mentioned in each story was 
calculated.  
This hypothesis was tested by conducting a Mann-Whitney U test. This test was chosen over the 
t-test because the dependent variable was not normally distributed (skewness was 1.52 and was 
kurtosis 1.45). This hypothesis was supported: z = -4.24, p < .05. The NYTimes.com contained 
more mentions of past disasters (M=.51, SD = .72) than did the Yomiuri Shimbun online stories 








H4A: The number of stories with conflicting information (i.e., death, injury, missing, and 
damage estimates) about the March 2011 earthquake will be greater in the NYTimes.com than in 
the Yomiuri Shimbun online coverage. 
 To investigate this question, graphs were made to depict the numbers reported for death 
estimates, damage estimates, and missing estimates (injury estimates will not be shown due to a 
very low frequency of estimates reported in the entire sample). Figures 2, 3, and 4 depict the 
differences in the coverage between the two newspapers. It is important to note that there were 
two different codes for area of estimate; the estimates in stories could either have been a national 
estimate or a local/specific town/prefecture/city estimate. The figures depict only the national 
estimates to allow for comparison between the two newspapers.  
 Death estimates were the most common estimate reported (43 mentions).As can be seen 
in Figure 2, death estimates fluctuated throughout the 36 days studied. This occurred between the 
two newspapers as well as within the newspapers themselves. It could have been assumed that 
the Japanese reports would be less conflicting because the National Police Agency releases an 
official death, injury, missing, and damage report, updated almost weekly. Interestingly that was 
not the case, although the fluctuations were not as erratic as the New York Times, nor were the 
reports as often.  
 Missing estimates (see Figure 3) were the second most common reported estimate (28 
mentions). Similar to the death estimates, there was some fluctuation throughout the time period 






 Damages were not as widely reported (10 mentions). Again, the NYTimes.com reported 
more damage estimates than the Yomiuri Shimbun, but interestingly the largest fluctuation came 















































Death Estimates for the March 2011 Japan Earthquake/Tsunami as Reported in the 











































Figure 3  
 
Missing Estimates for the March 2011 Japan Earthquake/Tsunami as Reported in the 





















































Figure 4  
 
Damage Estimates for the March 2011 Japan Earthquake/Tsunami as Reported in the 


























































 Within the sample 15.6% of stories used at least four sources and the most sources used 
in any one story was 18 sources. On average, across the sample, 3.87 sources were used per 
story. The NYTimes.com used an average of 4.58 sources for each story, and the Yomiuri 
Shimbun used an average of 3.20 sources per story. Overall, between both newspapers, “official” 
sources were the most commonly used source type; 20.7% all sources used were “official.” The 
NYTimes.com used an average of 1.30 “official” sources per story and the Yomiuri Shimbun 
used an average of 0.92 sources per story. 
 “Educational/research/expert” sources were the second most used source type (17.7% of 
sources) and “other” sources came in third having 16.2% of sources categorized as such.  
 
H5A: The Yomiuri Shimbun will use more sources in its earthquake coverage than will the 
NYTimes.com coverage.  
  This hypothesis was tested by conducting a Mann-Whitney U test because the dependent 
variable was not normally distributed (skewness was 1.55 and was kurtosis 4.02).  
The hypothesis was not supported. In fact, the NYTimes.com used significantly more 
sources in its coverage (M=4.58, SD = 2.41) than did the Yomiuri Shimbun (M = 3.2, SD = 3.28), 
z = -8.09, p < .025.  
 






 This hypothesis was tested using a Mann-Whitney U test due to a non-normally 
distributed dependent variable data (skewness was 2.61 and kurtosis was 11.27). It was not 
significant: z = -3.45, p < .025. The Yomiuri Shimbun (M=0.92, SD = 1.65) did not use more 
“official” sources than did the NYTimes.com (M=1.30, SD = 1.56) coverage. 
 
H5C: Across both papers, there will be more use of “official” sources than non-official sources. 
 This hypothesis was tested by conducting a Wilcoxin Signed Ranks test due to non-
normally distributed variables (skewness for “official” sources was 2.61 and kurtosis was 11.27, 
skewness for nonofficial sources was 1.46 and kurtosis was 3.14). This hypothesis was not 
supported.  In fact, Nonofficial sources (M = 2.77, SD = 2.65) were used more than “official” 
sources (M = 1.11, SD = 1.62) in the coverage of the March 2011 earthquake/tsunami and 
nuclear disasters, z = -10.98, p < .05. 
  
Media Hype and Disaster Coverage 
General Information 
 In the study, stories were coded for one of three themes: earthquake/tsunami, nuclear, or 
the story could have been about both earthquake/tsunami and nuclear topics. The sample yielded 
224 (44.1%) stories that were categorized as earthquake/tsunami stories, 210 (39.1%) that were 
categorized as nuclear, and 103 (19.2%) that covered them both equally.   
 
Research Question 1: For both the NYTimes.com and the Yomiuri Shimbun, is there more 





 To investigate this research question, only stories about the March 
2011earthquake/tsunami or earthquake/tsunamis and the nuclear crisis or nuclear power in 
general were used. Since all stories that were about both earthquake/tsunami and nuclear were 
excluded, 434 became the N. Within those parameters and across the sample, 51.6% of stories 
(224) were categorized as earthquake/tsunami and 48.4% (210) were categorized as nuclear.  
A chi-square was run: the result was not significant:  2(1, N = 434) = .452, p = .502. 
There was no difference between the amount of nuclear crisis coverage and the amount of 






















This study investigated how two newspapers, one from the United States and one from 
Japan, reported the March 2011 earthquake/tsunami and nuclear crisis in Japan. In particular, the 
study analyzed the role of disaster myths, past disasters, conflicting information, sources, and 
media hype in the coverage of this disaster during the 36 days after it struck.  
 The theoretical foundations for this study were culture, agenda setting, and framing.  
 
Disaster Myths 
Some differences in the use of disaster myths were found. The NYTimes.com used the 
panic flight myth significantly more (4.6% of stories) than the Yomiuri Shimbun (0.7% of 
stories). The fact that the U. S. publication used this myth more supports the idea of the differing 
cultures affecting disaster news coverage, in the literature review. According to Hofstede (1981; 
2001), the United States is more individualistic and short-term oriented which could explain why 
The New York Times reported people panicking more often than did the Yomiuri Shimbun. 
However, for the looting myth, there were no differences between the two newspapers. 
Overall, looting was mentioned only five times. The NYTimes.com mentioned looting three 
times (1.1% of stories) and the Yomiuri Shimbun mentioned looting twice (0.7% of stories). The 
low frequency with which this myth was used by the NYTimes.com may be attributed to the 
journalists’ perception of Japanese culture, mainly the idea that the Japanese are a long-term 
oriented (or patient) people (Hofstede, 1981; 2001). As a result the New York Times journalists 
might not have expected this type of behavior to be exhibited by the Japanese. Additionally, the 





system discussed earlier; Japanese journalists are practically embedded in government offices 
across the country. Many of the stories published in the Yomiuri Shimbun online came directly 
from press releases from the government and press conferences put on by the government. The 
government would not want to perpetuate this myth because it wants to have control over the 
disaster situation; by reporting looting as having occurred the government might signal that it 
does not have control. 
The small number of looting and panic flight myths found in the two newspapers is 
counter to results from other studies (Fischer, 1994, 1998; Wenger & Friedman, 1986; Goltz, 
1984; and Quarantelli & Dynes, 1972).  This difference may be because previous studies are 
dated, most having been done in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Originally, the study was going to assess the use of three additional myths:  psychological 
dependency, disaster shock, and evacuation behavior. However, because of difficulty in attaining 
intercoder reliability for these three myths, they were dropped from the study. The inability to 
obtain intercoder reliability, after repeated attempts as outlined in the methods section, suggests 
the use of these myths may be quite subtle in news reporting, making them difficult to identify 
and attain intercoder reliability. Additionally, researchers do not agree upon the conceptual 
definitions for the three disaster myths. For example, the conceptual definitions of psychological 
dependency and disaster shock are quite similar, making them very hard to identify 
independently. Further, Quarantelli et al. (1993) found that, in their study of newspapers from the 
United States and Japan, it was very difficult to identify disaster myths.  
It was predicted that the NYTimes.com would use more myths in the first five days of 
coverage versus the last 30 days included in this study. However, this hypothesis was not 





unexpected. I thought, based on the United States’ being so far away from the disaster zone, that 
the NYTimes.com reporters would rely more on assumptions because it would difficult for them 
to reach Japanese sources in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. However, over time, I 
believed that the NYTimes.com would have time to locate credible Japanese sources.   
It was also found that time and culture did not interact to predict the number of myths 
used in the stories. This result may be because of the small number of mentions of disaster myths 
(19 mentions total, 3.5% of stories contained one or both of the myths) in the sample.  
Hofstede’s (1981; 2001) work on culture was used as a basis for my predictions on the 
role culture plays in the use of disaster myths in news reporting as it is widely used as a basis for 
communication research about the effect of culture on communication. However, in light of the 
criticisms of his research, (i.e., it is dated, not generalizable, and his methods are questionable), 
his research is not as relevant to mine as thought. Further, it behooves other communication 
researchers to update our use of culture. The reliance on Hofstede’s work needs to be re-
examined because the current reliance on this dated study may be detrimental to future findings. 
As discussed in the literature review, Anthropologists argue that culture changes over time, 
therefore, an argument should be made on the discontinuance of the heavy use of Hofstede’s 
work in the field of communication, or at the very least, Hofstede’s work should be duplicated to 
see if/how national cultures have changed over time, an idea that could help many fields, not just 
communication and journalism.  
 
Past Disaster Mentions 
When it came to the use of past disasters, The New York Times (M = .51, SD = 0.72) used 





Shimbun (M = 0.26, SD = 0.52). Journalists may have mentioned past disasters as a way of 
priming readers of what to think of when they thought of the current disaster. NYTimes.com 
journalists may have used past disasters more because their readers were thousands of miles 
away from the events in Japan and they might have assumed that references to past disasters was 
a useful way to help U.S. readers understand the magnitude of the disaster in Japan.  
 
Gatekeeping 
In all the excitement of covering a disaster, the gatekeeping aspect of reporting may be 
more lax leading to a conveyance of conflicting information. Even though there were not many 
estimates reported, Figures 2, 3, and 4 on pages 83-85 suggest that conflicting information was 
reported during disaster coverage. Overall, Figures 2, 3, and 4 depict just how confusing the 
reporting of these estimates may have been in news articles; the numbers fluctuate sometimes 
from day to day. This fluctuation could be due to a number of things, one of which is that access 
to information could have been limited and reporters who were not in Japan when the disaster 
struck may have been unable to get immediate access to those with information regarding the 
death, missing, injury, or damage estimates.  
Fischer (1994) reported that often times estimates like the death toll are inflated right 
after the disaster happens, (probably because reporters are “ball parking” numbers based on the 
intensity of the disaster and the size of the population affected by the disaster) and decrease, 
often significantly, over time. The number one reason these estimates decline so much is because 
victims can be counted twice and it takes time to obtain accurate estimates (Fischer, 1994).   
The Japanese government may have also played a role in the fluctuation of the estimates 





government is more involved in the dissemination of information via press clubs, leading to a 
more censored media. This could have had a trickle-down effect on international media in that 
most international reporters are not part of a press club, so information is restricted, forcing 
international reporters like those from the United States to guess or “ballpark” estimates. Overall, 
the NYTimes.com used more estimates (66 estimates total) than did the Yomiuri Shimbun (15 
estimates total). The fluctuations in the NYTimes.com varied more than they did within the 
Yomiuri Shimbun, as is depicted in the figures on pages 83-85. 
 
Source Use 
The use of different sources can also be an indication of how a story has been framed. 
This study investigated directly quoted sources because researchers have found that direct quotes 
in news reports have more of an impact on people’s issue perception (Gibson & Zillmann, 1993) 
than do sources that are not directly quoted.  This study investigated seven categories of directly 
quoted sources: official, NGO, victim, other media sources, educational/research/experts, 
business, and other sources. On average, 3.87 sources were used per story.  
Across all stories in the sample, 12.3% of stories used only one source, 15.1% used only 
two sources, and 15.6% used four sources; the most sources used in any single story was 18. 
It was found that the Yomiuri Shimbun (M = 3.20) used fewer sources than did the 
NYTimes.com (M = 4.57) in its coverage of the March 2011 Japan disaster, which was counter 
to my prediction. What is interesting, based on what is known about the Japanese press clubs, 
and the fact that the Japanese journalists should have had access to a larger variety of sources, is 
that the Yomiuri Shimbun used fewer sources than did the NYTimes.com. These results indicate 





growth of international media could explain why the NYTimes.com was able to access so many 
sources, even though the newspaper is thousands of miles away from where the disaster 
occurred. The Internet and wire services have made it easier to report on far away happenings.  
When it came to the use of “official” sources, my prediction that the Yomiuri Shimbun 
would use more “official” sources than would the NYTimes.com was not supported; the Yomiuri 
Shimbun did not use more “official” sources (M = 0.92) than did the NYTimes.com (M = 1.30). 
I believe this was the case because in U.S. journalism there is a focus on source use; finding and 
using official sources, or simply the use of more sources in general, sometimes seems to be the 
way to make stories more credible. 
 This study also measured Quarantelli’s command post point of view (H5C), the idea that 
reporters rely more on “official” sources when reporting on disasters, staying close to the 
designated command post to get information; this idea was not supported. Across both 
newspapers, “official” sources were not used more than non-official sources. This was surprising 
because it seems that throughout disaster reporting, journalists try to talk to those who know 
what is going on, assuming that those who do know what is going on are involved in the disaster 
response and recovery efforts.  
The high use of “educational/research/expert” sources may be an indication that the 
definition of “official” sources needs to be expanded. A story that uses these sources may look to 
readers as though those experts quoted know what they are talking about, similar to the way 
“official” sources are viewed. The high use of “official” sources and 
“educational/research/expert” sources (17.7%) in this study makes sense in that readers want to 





finding is beyond the scope of this study, further studies can look at how viewers view those 
sources. 
The “other” category accounted for a large percentage of sources as well (16.2%), 
suggesting that there may have been additional categories in which to place sources that should 
have been used. It may have been more beneficial to use emergent coding for this section to be 
sure my categories were mutually exclusive.   
 
Media Hype 
It was thought that the March 2011 earthquake/tsunami and nuclear crisis might have 
been a trigger event for a nuclear crisis media hype; however, results revealed that this was not 
the case. More than half (51.6%) of the stories were categorized as earthquake/tsunami stories, 
and 48.4% were categorized as nuclear stories. One reason that a nuclear crisis media hype may 
not have been detected was that the sample may not have covered a sufficient time period. There 
could be a media hype involving the nuclear crisis after the earthquake/tsunami; however, it 
could have, for example, started in week three of the disaster; my study only covered the first 36 
days after the earthquake struck. This short time span may not have allowed for a detection of the 
media hype, if it was in fact there. 
   
Limitations and Future Research 
This study was limited in that it only investigated online newspaper coverage, excluding 
all other forms of media such as broadcast news, radio, and social media networks like Twitter 
and Facebook. A future study could investigate other news media and social networks to see, for 





analyze the extent to which the traditional news media relied on social media outlets like 
Facebook and Twitter to get sources, quotes, and information. 
 
Another important limitation is that this investigation looked at a wide variety of 
variables, instead of focusing on a smaller number of variables. Some of the variables touched 
upon in this study would do well in their own, separate study. For example, disaster myths could 
be investigated in more detail on their own, which would allow researchers to determine whether 
myths are not currently in vogue or whether they are present in more subtle ways in media 
coverage.  
Also, this study only looked at news stories and features. It excluded opinion pieces such 
as blogs, editorials, and letters to the editor. Perhaps a study done on these types of media 
content would find more use of disaster myths, damage and death estimates, and past disaster 
mentions. It is possible that writers of these opinion pieces may be more likely to perpetuate 
disaster myths and use past disasters more to understand current ones because they are also 
trying to understand what has happened; the only way they may know how to convey the 
information is by drawing upon images, words, and past experiences from past disasters. This is 
also where the United States’ vast Hollywood collection of disaster related movies may influence 
the use of disaster myths.  
 
In future research, I highly suggest investigating the use of price gouging (Fischer, 1994), 
a myth previously studied by other researchers that I decided to leave out believing that the five I 





should look into the extent to which price gouging is mentioned in stories and then compare it to 
whether price gouging really occurred. 
Future research involving disaster myths could involve the use of images (e.g., photos, 
videos) as they may be sources of disaster myths. 
A final limitation for the disaster myth portion of this study is that data on the extent to 
which people did loot, panic, etc., is not readily available. Thus, it is impossible to determine 
whether mentions of looting and panic flight were truly the perpetuation of myths or the 
reporting of actual events.  
In the section of my study about estimates, I discussed that I only counted damage 
estimates that were not listed in terms of insurance. Future studies should decide how to deal 
with these insurance estimates, as that was a common way that damage estimates were reported 
in this study.  
Another limitation in my coding was that I used a priori coding for both sources and past 
disaster mentions instead of emergent coding. The use of a priori coding, or having 
predetermined categories may have meant that I missed some other potential categories of past 
disasters and sources. 
In my study of culture’s influence on disaster coverage, only two cultures were 
investigated. Future studies could expand on the cultural aspects of disaster coverage by 
including a higher number of different cultures.  Also, this study investigated culture as being a 
factor for the framing of the disaster news stories; however, the study did not take into account 
all aspects of culture that could influence reporting, such as the specific culture of the newspaper 
company studied and cultural differences in the way journalists are educated, among others.  





differences may be more apparent when multiple news outlets from cultures are studied. 
Additionally, the fact that I used the English version of the Yomiuri Shimbun and not the 
Japanese edition is a potential limitation in that culturally significant differences in the way 
things are worded from language to language have been documented (Maeda, 2011; Hood, 
2012).  
One of the key aspects of this study, i.e., its comparison of media reporting between the 
country directly affected by a disaster and another country, could also be regarded as a 
springboard for future research.  A future study could build on what was found in this study by 
analyzing news coverage from two different countries, neither of which is the disaster event 
country. 
 
Media hype is another variable that could be investigated on its own and over a longer 
period of time. The data gathered from a longitudinal study could lead to a better understanding 
of media hypes and disasters. Media hypes are a form of agenda setting (Vasterman, 2005); they 
are “created on the basis of one frame that guides the hunt for more news and presents all the 
facts and views from the same perspective” (Vasterman, 2005, p. 525). Such a longitudinal study 
could be further strengthened by using more than one newspaper from each country. By using 
multiple newspapers from each country, media hypes could be more pronounced and easy to 
follow.  
 
Also, this study does not take an in-depth look at how stories were worded. A closer 
investigation into the wording of stories could be another important aspect to include regarding 





culture to culture. For example, the Japanese language can be interpreted differently, depending 
on the interpreter (Hood, 2012; Nathan, 2002). The Japanese have also been found to describe 
events like that of the bombing of Hiroshima and the end of World War II (Meada, 2003) 
differently. The Japanese would not report that it was defeated; instead, reporters wrote that the 
war was over with no mention of defeat (Maeda, 2003). Also, after the bombing of Hiroshima, 
newspapers downplayed the death toll and the destruction of the city; historically, Japan has tried 
to avoid describing things in a negative light (Maeda, 2003).  
Another potential limitation within my study is that I did not interview the journalists 
who wrote the stories. A future investigation that includes interviews with reporters could help to 
explain why reporters did (or did not) mention disaster myths and past disasters and how they 
decided on source for the stories.  
All of these limitations should be taken into consideration and should be used as stepping 
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Variable Name: Date 
Variable Label: Date story was published  
For date of publication find the top published date. Then record the date by which day of the 
sample it ran. For March 11, 2011, it would be day 1, the 12
th
 is day 2 and so on. Record the 
number of the day as 1, 2, 3, 4, etc.  
 
 
Variable Name: Outlet 
Variable Label: Newspaper site the story ran on 
This variable is what newspaper website this story is from. To find the outlet, read the masthead. 
 
0 = Ran on NYTimes.com 
1 = Ran on Yomiuri Shimbun Online website 
 
 
Variable Name: Author 
Variable Label: Who wrote the story 
This variable is who actually wrote the story—was it a wire story or was the story written by a 
staff member at the newspaper websites being investigated. This includes contributions and 
collaborations. To find the story author, read the byline at the top of the story. Also, check the 
bottom of the story to determine whether the story had collaborators or contributors.  
 
0 = Wire story (AP, Canadian Press, Federal News Service, Globe Newswire, Press Association 
of Britain, Reuters, United Press International and Kyodo World Service of Japan) To find a list 
of wire services go to ajr.org. 
1 = Staff writer (listed as a staff member of the source newspaper) 
2 = Collaborated/Contributions-Story was written by more than one reporter from the source or 
the story had contributions from a wire service or other news outlet in affected area, 
contributions were made to a story written by a staff reporter from the source newspaper. Could 
also be that the byline says AP or some other wire service, but at the conclusion of the story it 
says “staff writers contributed to this story.” 
3 = Author was a freelancer. It might say “Jackson James, for the Times,” or even state that they 
are a freelance reporter. 













SOURCES: ALL SOURCES 
For these variables, read the entire story to locate all the sources used.  
 
PLEASE FOLLOW THE CODE SCHEME AND NOT PERSONAL OPINION. PLEASE 
CODE SOURCES AS THE REPORTER MEANT THEM TO BE USED IN THE STORY.   
 
A source is defined as a person, or entity (e.g., a company or an organization) that provides 
information and opinions that is attributed to that entity. According to Brown, Bybee, Wearden 
and Straughn, (1987), sources should “meet standard definitions of reliability, trustworthiness, 
authoritativeness and articulateness” (p. 46). When looking for sources, only count full or partial 
direct quotes. The source has to have been directly quotes as having said something and 
quotation marks were used. Quotes can be partial but MUST have attribution to them. Be careful 
to not confuse partial quotes with those phrases or sentences that are placed in quotation marks 
for emphasis, this is why it is important to account for attribution. Ships loudspeaker direct 
quotes DO NOT count. Also, if the reporter directly quotes someone from a group of people but 
does not make it clear who they are referring to, DO NOT count this either (too confusing). 
 
If there are any sources from organizations that you are unsure of GOOGLE it and figure out 
what the organization is. It is very important that if there are any organizations, associations, 
agencies, research institutes etc., that are unclear to you that you research it so that it gets 
categorized in the correct category.  
 
READ CAREFULLY to fully figure out where the source goes.  
 
Only count each source once, for example if the story quotes the same person three times, it only 
counts once. Each different source will be counted. 
 
 
Variable Name: Official_sources 
Variable Label: Story use of Official sources used 
Officials are defined as those who are elected or appointed to their positions. They include all 
government sources. A government source is defined as those sources that are at the federal level 
in the United States or unitary level in Japan, as well as state and local levels for both countries. 
The federal level includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the United 
States and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication’s Fire and Disaster Management 
Agency (FDMA) in Japan. The state, regional or prefectural level would include state leaders in 
the United States like governors and in Japan this would be the governor of a prefecture. The 
local level of government is also included here; this includes fire, police, all city employees, 
including mayors, and local civil defense for both the United States and Japan. 
 Also, sources that in general have primary social control functions. Official sources include city 
police and fire department officials, and emergency management government agencies such as 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), FDMA (Japan). An official source could 
also be Japan’s Self-Defense Force, or any source that states it is affiliated with the government 





.gov. If there are any questions as to what kind of organization it may be, be sure to look it up on 
the internet.  
Enter the number of official sources used (0 = no official sources, 1 = 1 was found and so on). 
 
 
Variable Name: NGO_sources 
Variable Label: NGO sources  
Non-governmental organizations are any nonprofit, voluntary citizen group, organized on a local, 
national, or international level and would include organizations like the American Red Cross, the 
British Red Cross or Save the Children. If you cannot tell whether an organization is an NGO, 
you can do a computer search on the organization, there is a website called the Worldwide NGO 
Directory and it could be helpful in determining whether the organizations in Japan are an NGO 
or a government source 
Enter the number of NGO sources used (0 = no NGO sources, 1 = 1 was found and so on). 
 
 
Variable Name: Media_sources 
Variable Label: Other media sources 
Other media sources can include local, national, international journalists, newspapers, television 
news broadcasts and otherwise. Sometimes journalists use other journalists as sources, for 
example, “CNN reported that the U.S. has donated millions of dollars to the relief effort in 
Haiti,” or “Associate Press reported…” 
Enter the number of Media sources used (0 = no media sources, 1 = 1 was found and so on). 
 
 
Variable Name: Victim_Sources 
Variable Label: Sources that are survivors or victims of the disaster 
Victim sources include citations of anyone who was a survivor or victim from the 
earthquake/tsunami and nuclear disaster. This can be anyone who discusses the disaster(s) and is 
quoted by the story author. These must be FEET ON THE GROUND victims/survivors that are 
discussing the earthquake and what they went through, how it’s affecting them and so on. Any 
source classified as a victim must have been in Japan when the disaster occurred.  
Enter the number of victim sources used (0 = no victim sources, 1 = 1 was found and so on). 
 
 
Variable Name: Education_Research_expert_sources 
Variable Label: Expert sources used not associated with the government 
Educational/research/expert sources include educational sources such as professors that study for 
example, earthquakes or the Japan culture. They could also be members of agencies not 
associated with the government and that are not NGOs. An example of one such source would be 
the National Press Photographers Association. Some research may be needed here to determine 
where the organization fits. These are anyone who may be an expert in anything.  
 
For example, a source that might be used is an engineer or someone from an organization or club 
that supports their field, like an association of geologists or seismologists and so on. Sources 





organization title. These organizations are not to be confused with NGOs, be sure to research any 
questionable organizations used.  
 
Also included here would be any sources referred to as “former presidents or former anything 
associated with any organization, university and so on,” do not count them as official sources if it 
says they were a FORMER member of an official organization. They count as experts because 
they are technically no longer affiliated with that organization.  
 
Enter the number of educational/research/expert sources used (0 = no education sources, 1 = 1 
was found and so on). 
 
 
Variable Name: Business 
Variable Label: Spokesperson from organization(s)/businesses 
A spokesperson source includes any public information officer (PIO), public relations 
representative, director of communications or any person stating they are the spokesperson for 
such and such. For example, any company affected by the disaster may have their 
communications person speak with the media, someplace this might be seen is coverage about 
the automotive industry or any other company reported on affected by the disaster. Another 
example would be “Karen Cisco, spokesperson for Three Mile Island said…” This also includes 
businesses quoted in America regarding loss of money from imports from Japan (car dealerships 
(managers and what not) and so on for example).  
Enter the number of Business sources used (0 = no business sources, 1 = 1 was found and so on).  
 
 
Variable Name: Other_Source 
Variable Label: Other sources used or unable to determine 
If you cannot determine what category the source falls under, use the “other” sources variable. 
Or, if it is unclear as to who is speaking or who the source may be, use the “other” source 
variable. This can include unnamed passersby, sources with only first names and/or sources who 
wished to remain anonymous and were given no other attribution.  For example, if an article 
states “According to reports, this is the worst disaster since 1900…” it would fall under “other” 
sources because it is not clear what reports or from where these reports originated. 
 
Other types of sources that may be listed under here are medical sources. Medical sources 
include doctors, nurses, staff members of a hospital, hospital directors and the like. These 
members and the hospital do not speak on behalf of organizations like the Center for Disease 
Control or other large organizations affiliated with the government or NGOs. For example, if it 
says “Duane Lee, a doctor with the Asia Association of Medical laboratory Scientists (AAMLS) 
said…” is a source that would not count here; it would fall under NGO sources because AAMLS 
is an NGO. 









ESTIMATES OF DEATH, INJURY, MISSING, AND DAMAGES 
These variables are to measure the fluctuation of death, injury, missing and damage estimates. 
To get the most accurate measure, read the entire story to determine if a specific estimate is 
given. If yes, enter a 1, if no enter a 0 and move onto the next variable.  
 
If there was a specific death toll given, or injury, missing, or damage estimate given, we then 
need to know if a specific area was talked about.  
 
Enter a 1 if the area discussed was a specific subset of an area affected by the disaster such as a 
city, prefecture(s), region, eastern, northern part of Japan. 
 
Enter a 2 if it talked about Japan as a whole, in general (talks about the earthquake and tsunami 
as one big event) and the estimates given are not to any specific area in Japan. 
 
For each estimate that is mentioned that follows the rules set forth below for each variable, 
record the number on the code sheet provided.  
 
 
Variable Name: Death_estimates 
Variable Label: Mention of deaths estimated 
This variable will measure the fluctuation of death toll estimates found in the news stories. 
Record the death toll estimate number as it appears written in the story.  
 
For example, it might say “an estimated 10,000 people are dead,” write 10,000 down, or “The 
death toll is expected to reach 20,000,” record 20,000.  
 
Only record specific numbers; do not record anything if it says something like, “Thousands 
are expected dead,” or hundreds of thousands, and the like.  
 
If the story says something like “The death toll is expected to range from 10,000 to 12,000,” take 
the middle, so it would be 11,000 deaths. If the story says the death toll is expected to exceed 
20,000, record 20,000. If the story mentions the death toll more than once and the numbers 
differ, count them both, only if each number listed is from a different source. For example, if it 
says, “the Red Cross estimates the death toll at 15,000 and government officials list the death toll 
at 20,000,” record both.  
 
If the differing numbers do not have two different sources, take the average of the two numbers 
given.   
 











Variable Name: Injury_estimates 
Variable Label: Mention of injury estimates 
 This variable will measure the fluctuation of injury estimates found in the news stories. Record 
the injury estimate number as it appears written in the story. For example, it might say “100,000 
are expected with injuries,” or “An estimated 20,000 with injuries are expected, and so on.  
 
If the story says something like “The injuries are expected to range from 10,000 to 12,000,” take 
the middle, so it would be 11,000 injured. If the story says the number of those injured is 
expected to exceed 10,000, record that as 10,000.  
 
If the story mentions the number of those injured more than once and the numbers differ, count 
them both, only if each number listed is from a different source. For example, if it says, “the Red 
Cross estimates the number injured at 15,000 and government officials list the number injured at 
20,000,” record both. If the differing numbers do not have two different sources, take the 
difference of the two numbers given.  
 
Do not record hundreds or thousands as numbers, only those estimates with specific 
numbers are the ones you will record. If there are no injury estimates, enter a 0. 
 
 
Variable Name: Missing_estimates 
Variable Label: Estimates of those missing 
This variable will measure the fluctuation of the missing people estimates found in the news 
stories. Record the missing people estimate number as it appears written in the story. For 
example, it might say “an estimated 10,000 people are missing,” write 10,000 down, or “The 
numbers of those missing is expected to reach 30,000,” record 30,000.  
 
Only record specific numbers, do not record anything if it says something like, “Thousands 
are expected to be missing,” or hundreds of thousands, and the like. If the story says 
something like “The number of those missing are expected to range from 10,000 to 12,000,” take 
the middle, so it would be 11,000 missing. If the story says that the number of those missing is 
expected to exceed 10,000, record 10,000.  
 
If the story mentions the death toll more than once and the numbers differ, count them both, only 
if each number listed is from a different source. For example, if it says, “the Red Cross estimates 
the number missing at 15,000 and government officials list the number missing at 20,000,” 
record both. If the differing numbers do not have two different sources, take the average of the 
two numbers given.  
 











Variable Name: Damage_estimates 
Variable Label: Number of Damage estimates 
This variable will measure the fluctuation of the estimates of the damage done found in the news 
stories. Record the damage estimates number as it appears written in the story. For example, it 
might say “an estimated one million dollars of damage is expected,” write 1,000,000 down, or 
“damages are expected to reach $2 million,” record 2,000,000.  
 
Only record specific numbers, do not record anything if it says something like, “damage is 
expected to reach millions,” or hundreds of thousands, and the like.  
 
If the story says something like “The damage is expected to range from $1,000,000 to 
$5,000,000,” take the middle, so it would be $3,000,000.  If the story says that damage is 
expected to exceed $20 million, record it as $20,000,000.  
 
If the story mentions the amount of damage expected more than once and the numbers differ, 
count them both, only if each number listed is from a different source. For example, if it says, 
“the Red Cross estimates the damage at $2 million and government officials estimate damage 
around $6 million,” record both. If the differing numbers do not have two different sources, take 
the average of the two numbers given. 
 
Insurance damages DO NOT count here. If the story is discussing damages in terms of 
insurance, DO NOT record it.  
 
If it does not have a damage estimate, enter a 0. 
 
 
Variable Name: Pastdisaster1  
Variable Label: Story mentions Chernobyl 
This variable will measure if the past disaster Chernobyl was mentioned in the news story. 
Enter a 0 if the nuclear disaster Chernobyl was not mentioned and a 1 if it was mentioned. Only 
count Chernobyl once per story. 
 
 
Variable Name: Pastdisaster2 
Variable Label: Story mentions Three Mile Island nuclear accident 
This variable will measure if the past disaster of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident was 
mentioned in the news story. Enter a 0 if Three Miles Island was not mentioned and a 1 if Three 
Mile Island was mentioned. Only count Three Mile Island once per story. 
 
 
Variable Name: Pastdisaster3 
Variable Label: Story mentions 1896 Japanese Tsunami 
This variable will measure if the past disaster of the 1896 Japanese Tsunami was mentioned in 
the news story. Enter a 0 if the 1896 Tsunami was not mentioned and a 1 if the 1896 Tsunami 







Variable Name: Pastdisaster4 
Variable Label: Story mentions 2004 Sumatra Tsunami 
This variable will measure if the past disaster of the 2004 Sumatra tsunami was mentioned in the 
news story. Enter a 0 if the tsunami was not mentioned and a 1 if the tsunami was mentioned. 
Only count the 2004 Sumatra tsunami once per story. This disaster could be listed under the 
names of the December 2004 tsunami, Indian Ocean tsunami, or as the Sumatra tsunami. It 
is NOT the 2004 Niigata quake.  
 
 
Variable Name: Pastdisaster5 
Variable label: Story mentions 1960 Chile Earthquake 
This variable will measure if the past disaster of Chile Earthquake was mentioned in the news 
story. Enter a 0 if the 1960 Chile Earthquake was not mentioned and a 1 if the 1960 Chile 
Earthquake was mentioned. Only count the 1960 Chile Earthquake once per story. 
 
 
Variable Name: Pastdisaster6 
Variable Label: Story mentions 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake 
This variable will measure if the past disaster of the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake was 
mentioned in the news story. Enter a 0 if the Great Kanto earthquake was not mentioned and a 1 




Variable Name: Pastdisaster7 
Variable Label: Story mentions 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake 
This variable will measure if the past disaster of the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake was 
mentioned in the news story. Enter a 0 if the Great Hanshin earthquake was not mentioned and a 
1 if the Great Hanshin earthquake was mentioned. Only count the Great Hanshin earthquake 
once per story. 
 
 
Variable Name: Pastdisaster8  
Variable Label: Story mentions other disaster 
This variable will measure if past disasters other than those listed were mentioned in the news 
story. Record the past disaster mentioned in space provided. 
 
 
Variable Name: Panic_Flight 
Variable Label: Story mentions panic flight myth 
For this variable, read through the entire story and determine whether the story mentions panic 
flight.  Panic flight deals with the individual; it is the idea that when a disaster occurs victims 
will panic and engage in any behavior they deem necessary to escape. An example of panic flight 
is when a reporter says that individuals panicked and ran from where they were and what they 





phrases like scrambled to get away, people were running everywhere as if they didn’t know 
where to go, they had a look of panic on their face as they ran away from the building are all 
phrases that might be seen. This myth only gets counted once, if mentioned, it’s either there or it 
isn’t.   
 
0 = story does not contain the panic flight myth 
1 = story contains the panic flight myth 
 
 
Variable Name: Looting 
Variable Label: Story mentions looting myth 
For this variable, read through the entire story and determine whether the story mentions looting. 
Looting is the taking of or stealing of items from homes and businesses while an area of a city, 
town, village, neighborhood and the like are evacuated for hazardous reasons such as floods and 
hurricanes or riots and blackouts. Looting may be reported as people taking items that are not for 
survival purposes and are used for personal gain, monetary and otherwise. For example, “Chaos 
gripped New Orleans on Wednesday as looters ran wild….looters brazenly ripped open gates and 
ransacked stores for food, clothing, television sets, computers, jewelry and guns” (McFadden and 
Blumenthal, 2005), or, “In the midst of the rising water, two men ‘were planning to head out to 
the levee to retrieve a stash of beer, champagne, and hard liquor they found washed out onto the 
levee,” would all count as containing the looting myth. Only count the myth once. If the story 
contains two or more areas where it discusses looting, it still only gets counted once, the myth is 
there or it isn’t. 
 
0 = story does not contain the looting myth 
1 = story contains the looting myth 
 
 
Variable Name: Disaster Shock 
Variable Label: Story mentions disaster shock 
For this variable, read through the entire story and determine whether the story mentions disaster 
shock. Disaster shock is the immediate response that is reported as being seen in survivors after a 
disaster has occurred. Survivors are stunned and in disbelief of the destruction. The shock is a 
shorter time span than that of psychological dependency. Disaster shock may be reported as 
people wandering about as if lost, sitting alone staring into space, walking as if they have no 
purpose anymore, or even in a zombie-like state.  
 
Fischer (1988) states: “’Friends of a friend’ of a victim often report that the survivor was so 
incapacitated that he sat on the ‘remains of his front porch for days, garden hose in hand, ready 
to wash the mud from the flood away, but was unable to move’” (Fisher, 1998, p. 16).  
 
This myth is only counted once. It’s either there or it isn’t. 
 
0 = story does not contain the disaster shock myth 






Variable Name: Psychological dependency  
Variable Label: Story mentions psychological dependency myth  
For this variable, read through the entire story and determine whether the story mentions 
psychological dependency. Psychological dependency is defined as victims and survivors being 
unable to function and take care of themselves after the disaster has struck.  In the news articles 
it may be reported as outside help being called into help with the recovery and response because 
victims and survivors are “out of it” and unable to take care of those hurt, those that need 
rescuing, the setting up of shelters and the gathering of food, water and necessary supplies.  
 
This myth is counted only once per story, it’s either there or it isn’t. 
 
0 = story does not contain the psychological dependency myth 
1 = story contains the psychological dependency myth 
 
 
Variable Name: Evacuation Behavior 
Variable Label: Story mentions evacuation behavior myth 
For this variable, read through the entire story and determine whether the story mentions 
evacuation behavior. Evacuation behavior refers to the group level of panic. This myth focuses 
on the behavior people portray when they are fleeing or evacuating and is that if there is an 
evacuation, residents will flee in an unorganized and hysterical way, pushing and shoving each 
other, driving each other off roads to escape the imminent danger of a disaster. This may be 
reported as highways being jammed and crowded, riddled with accidents and people driving 
erratically in high speeds to save themselves from the potential hazards with no regard for those 
around them.  
 
Deviant behavior is assumed in this myth. Fisher (1998) states: “Ask a potential evacuee if he is 
concerned about evacuating from a city when a forecast for a hurricane to impact the area and 
the likely response is:  
 Yes, I am concerned, I don’t want to join all those crazies as they flee, they’ll crowd and push each other
 off the roads trying to escape the path of the storm. . .why, they might even pack a gun, and worst yet, use
 it! (p. 17). 
 
This myth is counted only once per story, it’s either there or it isn’t. 
 
0 = story does not contain the evacuation behavior myth 
1 = story contains the evacuation behavior myth 
 
 
Variable Name: Media Hype 
Variable Label: Media hype of nuclear crisis 
For this variable, read the headline, lead and the entire story to determine what the main point 
was.  
 
What needs to be determined is the central theme of the story; is it focused on the earthquake 
and/or tsunami (March 2011 disaster), the nuclear crisis or is the theme about all three, the 





in general. For example, if the story was about the unclear reports and announcements about the 
level of nuclear damage and danger that would fall under here.  
 
Stories that would also fall under a code of 1, 2, or 3, is if the disaster was central to the action of 
the story. For example, if the story is about trading in money that was damaged in ATMs from 
the tsunami flood waters, or if the story was about the jobless getting jobs because they lost their 
jobs from the disasters. The disaster was central to the action of the story because the money had 
to be traded in due to the disaster and those that were jobless were that way because the disaster 
may have closed their companies or lost too much money in the disaster to rehire them; the 
disaster caused the main action of what was being told in the story and therefore should be coded 
as a 1, 2, or 3.  
 
For example, If the lead of a story read “Japan's nuclear disaster came at a time when nuclear 
power seemed poised for a new birth in the United States. Opinion polls have shown rising 
support for nuclear power over the past decade, after more than two decades of opposition. More 
significantly, environmentalists were slowly, tentatively abandoning their reflexive opposition to 
nuclear power because of the bigger problem of climate change. Japan's catastrophe hits the reset 
button on the whole issue. One irony is that the climate campaign is a big near-term loser, as 
carbon dioxide emissions in Japan and Germany (which switched off seven nuclear plants) will 
go up,” enter a 2.  
 
If a headline read “For many of the 10,000 displaced, the journey to shelter can be difficult,” you 
will have to read on to find out the theme for this variable. If the lead says the following: 
“TOKYO - While trying to recall the events since she and her extended family fled their homes 
near Japan's damaged nuclear reactors, Kyoko Kobayashi studied her pocket-size calendar as if 
years had passed.” This story was primarily about the journey this family took to find shelter 
after the earthquake and tsunami hit, followed by an evacuation because of nuclear danger. This 
story would be coded as a 3, since it mentions all three equally.  
 
0 = Story was, by the above definition and explanation, not about the March 2011        
earthquake/tsunami and nuclear crisis or earthquakes/tsunamis and nuclear power in general. The 
story should be thrown out due to irrelevance. 
 
1 = The March 2011 earthquake/tsunami was central to the story and/or the central theme to the 
story was about earthquakes/tsunamis in general, with no mention (or not a large mention i.e., 
one mention) spurred by the March 2011 disaster in Japan 
 
2 = The story was primarily about the nuclear crisis brought on by the tsunami and earthquake, 
or about nuclear power in general, with some sort of reference to the Japan nuclear crisis.  
 
3 = The March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and the nuclear crisis were all central to the story. (all 
aspects were treated with equal importance in the story. If you had to count the paragraphs and 
compare the focus of each, the number of paragraphs about the earthquake(s)/tsunami(s)  and the 
nuclear crisis (or issues in general) would be equal). 
 
